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INTRODUCTION
There were promises made across this desk! You mustn’t tell me
you’ve got people to see—I put thirty-four years into this firm . . .
and now I can’t pay my insurance! You can’t eat
the orange and
1
throw the peel away—a man is not a piece of fruit!

T

he United States has some of the most relaxed employment
2
protections in the world. The American employment regime is
centered on the long-standing employment-at-will doctrine, which
allows employers to discharge employees at any time and for any

1 ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 82 (Penguin Books 1976). Willy Loman’s
argument did not succeed, and he was fired anyway. See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828
F.2d 1202, 1205 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing a portion of the same). The court’s application
of Willy Loman’s language in Metz suffered a similar fate as Arthur Miller’s now-famous
protagonist. See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (7th
Cir. 1994) (noting that Metz had been subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)).
2 E.g., Donald C. Dowling, Jr., U.S.-Based Multinational Employers and the “Social
Contract” Outside the United States, 43 INT’L LAW. 1237, 1239–47 (2009) (detailing the
lack of employment protections for U.S. workers relative to their global counterparts).
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reason. No notice is required. Even absurd rationales, such as lefthandedness, are permissible grounds for discharge. Although a
number of exceptions exist, the core principle enabling broad freedom
4
to discharge remains firmly intact. All fifty states adhere to the
employment-at-will principle in some form, and exhortations to
5
overthrow the regime altogether have been unsuccessful.
Voluminous scholarship exists evaluating the propriety and
effectiveness of the employment-at-will doctrine. The doctrine has
produced a deep secondary literature displaying a full spectrum of
arguments and theories ranging from those advocating a complete
overthrow of the doctrine to others advocating strict enforcement
6
without exception. Numerous books are dedicated to explaining the
7
law on the subject, with one forthcoming tome an estimated nine
8
hundred pages long. The debate over employment at will shows no
3 The employment-at-will doctrine has a long history in American law. See generally
Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976) (providing an overview of the employment-at-will relationship).
4 Even though employment at will remains the core principle in American employment
law, a number of exceptions have developed to the doctrine. Unfortunately, the exceptions
are not universally adopted in the fifty states. In addition, the application of the exceptions
has created a chaotic jurisprudence. The result is that an employee’s success in bringing a
wrongful discharge case often depends more on the state in which she brings the lawsuit
than upon the facts of the case. Alternatively stated, identical cases brought in two
different states’ legal systems often result in different outcomes. See Scott A. Moss,
Where There’s At-Will, There are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of
Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 301 (2005) (“Interestingly, there is little
consistency in the case law limiting employment at will. States haphazardly adopt some
proposed exceptions while rejecting others that similarly limit employers' at-will
discretion.”).
5 See, e.g., Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594; David Dominguez, Just Cause
Protection: Will the Demise of Employment at Will Breathe New Life into Collective Job
Security?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 283 (1992); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and
Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
1443 (1996); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New
York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137 (1989). But see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
6 Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN.
L. REV. 517, 517 & n.1 (2004) (revealing approximately 230 law review articles published
over a nearly eighteen-year period in an online search). The result was obtained by
searching for “‘at will’ and some derivative of the word ‘employment’ in the[] title” using
the Westlaw legal research database. Id. at 517 n.1.
7 E.g., DANIEL MURNANE MACKEY, EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND EMPLOYER
LIABILITY (1986); LIONEL J. POSTIC, WRONGFUL TERMINATION: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (1994).
8 See EMPLOYMENT AT WILL: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Melinda J. Caterine ed.,
forthcoming 2011); see also BNA BOOKS: LEGAL PUBLICATIONS CATALOG 2011–2012,
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signs of slowing, as scholars apply its dictates to emerging
technologies and propose new ways to alleviate the sting of this harsh
9
workplace doctrine.
While this debate continues, very little empirical legal research
examines the perception of the most important constituent in the
discharge process: the employees themselves who risk arbitrary and
immediate termination. Employees do not approach involuntary
separation from their employers with the cold detachment that legal
rules convey. A loss of one’s employment to unfortunate but
uncontrollable conditions, such as a declining economy or a lack of
work, is devastating. Losing a job because of perceived unfair
treatment, such as a false accusation of incompetence or company
politics, by an indifferent employer, can provoke deep-seated anger
and resentment.
While employers can, and regularly do, terminate workers without
cause, notice, or reason, that does not necessarily mean that such legal
discharges occur without a price. Employees do not leave without
complaint, nor do they pursue redress only when the law stands in
their favor. Rather, the attitudes of employees toward discharge, and
their reactions to being discharged, originate from a complex set of
10
beliefs and attitudes that do not necessarily conform to legal rules.
Frivolous litigation, negative publicity, low morale, and increased
stress can all arise from the retaliatory actions of discharged
employees with a resultant decrease in productivity in the existing
work force.
Some of these employee reactions are beyond the employer’s
control. However, terminated employees may respond differently
according to their beliefs regarding the malevolence of others, their
inclination toward anger in everyday life, and their level of personal

http://www.bna.com/uploadedfiles/Content/Products/Books/catalog.pdf (last visited Oct.
12, 2011).
9 E.g., Stephen D. Lichtenstein & Jonathan J. Darrow, At-Will Employment: A Right to
Blog or a Right to Terminate?, 11 J. INTERNET LAW 1 (2008); Nicole B. Porter, The
Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 87
NEB. L. REV. 62 (2008); Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog: A
Proposal for Blogging, Employment-at-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42
VAL. U. L. REV. 245 (2007).
10 Professor Moss notes that “scholarship supports an argument that informal social
norms and free-market incentives adequately deter unjust terminations, rendering
employment litigation unnecessary.” Moss, supra note 4, at 342. But the argument can
also be used to support the claim that these norms and incentives are just as likely to raise
employee expectations of a just-cause termination right.
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anxiety. Yet, some of the most important antecedents of negative
employee behavior—the propriety of the discharge and
accompanying termination procedures—are fully within the
employer’s control. If employers can better understand how the
conditions and rationales of discharge impact the affected employee,
employers can avoid needless legal disputes and employees would
experience less frustration from perceived inequitable treatment.
While most scholarship examines the permissibility of discharge, this
Article uncovers the perception of discharge and its powerful impact
on litigation, retaliation, or other actions taken against employers.
Instead of merely speculating on this point, in this Article we
report the results of an empirical survey aimed at measuring the
reactions of individuals to various employment discharge scenarios.
The results of this survey offer striking insights into the workers’
perceptions of discharge under a variety of foreseeable conditions.
Part I of this Article examines the evolving law of employment
discharge. This part highlights the long history and development of
the modern rule. Far from being a construction of judicial fiat,
employment at will took hold in the United States as a result of a
number of social and economic developments that impacted
employment relations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Part II introduces the concept of the psychological contract, a
bundle of expectations an employee possesses about the mutual
obligations extant between the employee and the employer. The
psychological contract, a construct commonly used in human resource
literature, offers explanatory power in that it helps explain the
antecedents and outcomes of employment termination. In this Part
we show that breach of psychological contracts by employers can
have a meaningful effect on the attitudes of employees toward their
employer.
Part III provides the data and rationale for the empirical survey of
employment termination presented in this Article. The respondents in
the survey were provided one of twelve discharge scenarios involving
12
issues of procedural and substantive justice.
In some of the
scenarios, the participants were provided degrees of information as to

11 See, e.g., Robert Eisenberger et al., Who Takes the Most Revenge? Individual
Differences in Negative Reciprocity Norm Endorsement, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 787 (2004) (studying the impact of these and other variables on revenge
behavior).
12 See infra Appendix A.
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the state of the existing law of employment discharge. Respondents
were then questioned on their attitudes toward the company and their
14
willingness to seek legal redress. Part III then reports our findings.
The study found that while substantive and procedural fairness in
isolation improve employee attitudes, having both a fair reason and a
fair process for discharge considerably amplifies these positive
attitudes. We also reach the conclusion, among others, that
propensity to sue correlates with the legal knowledge of employees
regarding their rights or lack thereof. This Article concludes that
employers have a significant influence over whether former
employees take legal action or retaliate against the firm.
Part IV examines the role of norms in affecting perceptions,
generating expectations, and in the decision to resort to legal action.
It proposes that the psychological contract can best be understood as a
basket of norms. It notes the role of norms in the law-creation
process. This Part also examines the relational norms that form the
basis of relational contract theory and the psychological contract. In
the end, it notes, based upon the findings of the study, that feelings of
injustice (violation of the fairness norm) is the pervasive factor in
determining the outcome of employment termination. It also analyzes
the relationship between knowledge and perceptions, namely, the
issue of whether greater employee knowledge of the employment-atwill doctrine affects the employee’s perception of the employment
relationship.
Part V builds on the analysis of the previous Parts to advance ways
in which employers can utilize the fairness norm to control
employees’ expectations, preferences, and actions. It suggests a
number of “best practices” that help merge the internal
(psychological) contract and the external (legal) contract to the benefit
of both employer and employee. Finally, Part VI examines ways in
which employment law should be changed or applied in order to close
the gap between the reasonable expectations of employees found in
the psychological contract and the limited protections provided under
a strict employment-at-will legal regime. This Part also provides
ideas for future research based on the findings of the study,
recognizing certain issues not directly dealt with in the present study.

13
14

Id.
See infra Appendix B.

DIMATTEO

2011]

1/31/2012 1:37 PM

Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract

455

I
THE EVOLVING LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCHARGE
The employment-at-will doctrine governs most non-unionized,
private sector workers in the United States. The doctrine is as simple
as it is far reaching—an employer can terminate an employee for
15
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. Its origins date back to
16
The statute
the English Statute of Labourers, enacted in 1562.
provided employees a special status within the contractual nature of
17
the employment relationship.
It provided numerous employee
(apprentice) protections, including the requirement of notice and the
18
rule that apprentices were only dischargeable for reasonable cause.
The rule then developed that any hiring for an unfixed duration was
19
presumed to be for a year at a time.
The Industrial Revolution shifted the law-of-employment paradigm
from status-based employee protections to the contract-based
20
employment-at-will doctrine.
Horace Wood, in A Treatise on the
Law of Master and Servant, declared that employment at will was the
21
Accurate or not, Wood’s declaration of
law of the land.
15 This concept has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate. See supra notes 6–9
and accompanying text.
16 Statute of Labourers, 5 Eliz., c.4 (1562); see also Feinman, supra note 3, at 120.
17 Id.
18 IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER’S PRACTICAL
AND LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 16 (1989).
19 Id.
20 Id. For a fuller analysis of the role status in contract has played in the development
of the law, see Larry A. DiMatteo & Samuel Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 297
(2010) (exploring Nathan Isaacs’s thesis that legal development is not one of linear
progression, but one characterized by cycles between status-based and contract-based
relationships).
21 Wood’s statement on the issue is unequivocal:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches
that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party
may serve.
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT: COVERING THE
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES § 134, at 272
(1877). However, he could find only four cases to support this proposition. Id. § 134, at
272 n.4. Scholars have questioned whether any of Wood’s cases supported his
declaration. See, e.g., J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974). But see Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D.
Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 552
(1990) (“It is a factoid that Horace Wood spun the rule of at-will termination out of his
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employment at will as the common law’s default rule helped to
trigger the American legal system to discard the just-cause rule of
termination. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down laws that regulated employeremployee regulations due to the private contractual nature of the
22
employment relationship. Although the Supreme Court eventually
changed course to allow government regulation of the workplace,
“Wood’s Rule” has remained the law of employment termination.
Even though the termination-at-will principle has persisted, efforts
have been made to limit its application to correct perceived injustices.
The first recognized exception was the public policy exception. In
1959, a California court ruled that firing an employee for refusing to
23
commit perjury constituted an improper violation of public policy.
The public policy exception prohibits firings for reasons that society
has deemed to be against the public interest. For example,
termination due to missing work while serving on a jury or reporting
illegal conduct to law enforcement is recognized as a violation of
24
public policy. These more specific recognitions of public policy are
used to preempt the more general policy of freedom of contract that
underlies the employment-at-will rule.
Scholarly criticism in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged courts to
25
adopt more systematic exceptions to the rule. The result has been
the recognition of two additional exceptions in some states—the
26
implied-in-fact and implied-in-law exceptions. The implied-in-fact
own woolgathering. Wood's citations do support his proposition; it did not simply spring
‘full-blown in 1877 from his busy and perhaps careless pen. . . .’” (original alteration
omitted)); see also Feinman, supra note 3, at 125–27 (exploring Wood’s assertions in
more depth).
22 E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915) (“In all such particulars the employer
and the employé have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify
in a free land.”); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173–74 (1908).
23 Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
24 Bird, supra note 6, at 542.
25 E.g., Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania—A Proposal for Its
Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983); Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207 (1981); Donald
H.J. Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights in One’s Job: The Case for Limiting
Employment-at-Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763 (1982); Philip J. Levine, Comment, Towards a
Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1081 (1973).
26 Robert C. Bird & Donald J. Smythe, The Structure of American Legal Institutions
and the Diffusion of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 1978–1999, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 833,
837 (2008); Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV. 1233, 1243–
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contract exception grants rights to employees based upon
representations made by an employer orally or in written materials
such as employee handbooks, company policies, and representations
27
made through electronic means.
This exception grants employees
protection based upon an implied but legally binding contract. In
some cases, despite the express designation by the employer that the
employment is at will, courts have allowed evidence to show that an
implied contract had been formed requiring notice or just cause for
28
A number of courts have used the rationale that
the termination.
though the employment was at will at the time of commencement,
employer representations, materials, and practices worked a
29
modification to a just-cause employment contract.
The implied-in-law exception primarily looks at the motives of the
employer. It is more popularly referred to as the good-faith
exception. While the implied-in-fact exception focuses on the finding
of an actual contract based upon the particular facts and context of the
employment, the good-faith exception is based upon a general duty
30
that all employers owe to their employees.
The court reviews the
44 (1992); Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and
Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 647, 678–80 (1994); Julia Barnhart, Comment, The Implied-in-Fact Contract
Exception to At-Will Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L. REV. 817 (1998).
27 E.g., Philip H. Dorff, Jr. & Hugh J. Cain, The Evolution of the Implied Contract
Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Iowa: From Young to French and
Beyond, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 359, 360 (1994); see also Tammy Harris, Case Note, Brodie v.
General Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1997), 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 351
(1998) (reviews the use of employee handbooks in implied-in-fact employment lawsuits).
28 See Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(longevity of employment is a factor in finding a just-cause contract); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 890–92 (Mich. 1980) (enforced terms in
an employee handbook that policy of the company was discharge only for just cause); J.
Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837. See generally Robert S.
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith–Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (advancing excluder analysis, noting that good faith cannot
be defined, but bad faith is recognizable); Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195 (1968) (introducing the excluder analysis). But see Steven J. Burton, More on Good
Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497
(1984) (asserting that good faith can be conceptualized).
29 E.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 97–98 (Conn.
1995); Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445–
46 (N.Y. 1982).
30 Good faith is a metaprinciple or what one scholar referred to as “transubstantive”; in
other words, the principle occupies an entire area of law and is not context specific. See
Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?—Recent American
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facts of the case to determine if there was a breach of this societal
31
duty of good faith. However, as in other areas of the law where the
good-faith concept is used, there is a definitional problem. A
longstanding debate in contract scholarship has centered on the
problem of defining good faith. One of the approaches starts from the
32
premise that good faith is indefinable.
It then suggests that even
though good faith is indefinable, the law is able to recognize acts of
bad faith. Like obscenity, a judge knows bad faith when she sees it.
Professor Summers’s works on the recognition of bad faith as the
only way to apply the doctrine of good faith is referred to as the
33
“excluder analysis.” Under this approach, given facts are analyzed
to see if they fit a category of bad faith that has been developed in the
34
case law.
Good faith, under this definition, existed only in the
35
absence of bad faith.
While not all states have adopted these three exceptions, all fifty
states have enacted at least one of the three exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule. The public policy exception is the most
pervasive and at the same time the most narrowly construed of the
exceptions. A court would need to find an explicit public policy that
is being violated by the discharge. The implied-in-fact contract
exception is much broader in that it can apply to a large segment of
employee discharges. However, the employee has the burden of
proving that the facts of her case warrant an implication of a justcause employment contract. The implied-in-law or good-faith
exception is the broadest in scope and least recognized in the fifty
states. Its breadth is unlimited in that it implies a duty of good faith
into every employment relationship. The employee has the burden to
Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law’s Subsequent
Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1161.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) states, “Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.” See also U.C.C. § 1-304 (revised 2001) (codifying the good faith and fair
dealing requirement).
32 See Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 28, at 812–13 (explaining
the various ways courts have applied good faith and the variety of facts where good faith
has been applied); Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law, supra note 28, at
195 (arguing that, while scholars can agree that good faith is a minimum standard, the
varied forms that bad faith takes serve as evidence that defining it is a continued problem).
33 Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 28, at 820–21.
34 Id.; see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067,
1086–87 (2006).
35 Bird, supra note 6, at 559–60.
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prove that her employer had a bad-faith motive or reason for the
discharge. However, in spite of these exceptions, the doctrine of
employment at will remains firmly entrenched as the default
termination rule in the United States.
II
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRACT
Most employers understand the discretion that employment at will
provides. The freedom to terminate employees at will has numerous
benefits. Firms can make rapid shifts in employment staffing to
respond to economic declines or economic expansions. Knowing that
employees are relatively easy to terminate, employers are encouraged
to hire workers more quickly in times of rapid growth or seasonal
demand. Employment at will also increases the incentive for
employers to make labor, rather than capital, investments. For
example, the flexibility provided by employment at will may lead a
bank to elect to hire more tellers instead of building ATMs, or an
employer might choose to hire more workers for an assembly line
instead of investing resources in mechanical automation.
As noted above, from personal and societal perspectives, the
employment-at-will rule is not purely a source of harm. The rule
provides nimbleness and flexibility that allows the economy to
36
respond to the demands of the marketplace.
The extensive safety
net of employee protections found in European countries correlates
37
with higher rates of unemployment.
The costs of discharging an
36 As one international employment counsel explains in the context of a company
acquisition:
[A] stock (shares) buyer enjoys an unusual flexibility as to its newly-acquired
American employees because of the unique U.S. doctrine of employment-at-will.
A buyer that has recently acquired the stock of some other business remains free
to lay off all its newly-acquired U.S. employees without paying any severance
charges [unless exceptions apply] . . .
Going beyond lay-offs, U.S. employment-at-will leaves non-unionized
employers—and hence stock buyers—unshackled by vested rights obligations to
maintain work conditions after closing. A stock buyer is generally free to reduce
existing terms/conditions of newly-acquired non-union U.S. employees, to
demote them, to discontinue their benefits, to reduce their pay, to change their
job titles, and otherwise to restructure . . .
Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International HR Best Practice Tips: Summer 2010: Conducting
Internal Employee Investigation Outside the U.S., 19 INT’L HR J. 1 (2010).
37 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of
the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 921 (1996) (“The
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employee in some European countries, such as through the payment
of an indemnity and extensive notice requirements, tilt the decision in
close cases toward not hiring.
Despite the above benefits of the at-will rule, an employment
contract is not just another contract. The harm caused to the
discharged employee may go far beyond a monetary loss. A person’s
job is a core part of a person’s self-worth. An involuntary discharge
may shatter the employee’s self-image and place enormous stress on
38
the employee and her family. A loss of work can provoke feelings
39
of guilt and inadequacy. A discharged employee suffers from “an
increased likelihood of depression, alcohol and drug abuse, physical
40
illness, and even suicide.”
In many ways, the workplace has
supplanted the church and neighborhood as a primary source of
relational networks, self-identity, reputational status, and social
41
class. It is not surprising that an employee’s reaction to being fired
might provoke a concerted defensive action, an emotional response,
or a significant change in the employee’s perceptions of the former
employer.
The employer is not legally responsible for the personal harm
caused by termination. In the general course of running a business,
hiring and firing of employees is a necessity. However, the employer
is morally, and as a matter of good business practice professionally,
obligated to mitigate the harm caused by the employment discharge.
neglect of laissez-faire policies among continental members of the European Union is now
so notorious that a new word—“Eurosclerosis”—has been coined to describe the high
unemployment and slow growth engendered by excessive regulation and taxation.”);
Council Directive 94/45/EC, art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64, 66 (requiring large companies to
establish employee work councils that need to be consulted before a workforce reduction).
For a discussion of the Directive’s role in employment termination, see Brian Bercusson,
Labour Regulation in a Transnational Economy, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 244,
265–66 (1999).
38 Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
149, 162 (2005). Discharge and the unemployment that follows it trigger family strife and
influence how the children of the unemployed view the world and their own future role in
it. Id.
39 Id. (citing Connie T. Schliebner & John T. Peregoy, Unemployment Effects on the
Family and the Child: Interventions for Counselors, 72 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 368, 368
(1994) (“The stresses of unemployment can manifest themselves in depression, alcohol
and other drug abuse, suicide, physical illness, and family abuse.”)); see also Lea E.
Waters & Kathleen A. Moore, Predicting Self-Esteem During Unemployment: The Effect
of Gender, Financial Deprivation, Alternate Roles, and Social Support, 39 J. EMP.
COUNSELING 171, 171 (2002) (discussing the factors affecting the self-esteem of the
unemployed).
40 Bird, supra note 38.
41 Id. at 161.
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An employer who fires an employee on a moment’s notice and
without reason may not breach a legal contract, but the manner of the
discharge will enhance the perceived harm of the employee. A loyal
employee is likely to feel betrayed and suffer a sense of a breach of
trust based upon expectations extending from the employee to the
employer. This bundle of mental expectations that an employee has
with his or her employer is known as the psychological contract.
A. The Psychological Contract Construct
The psychological contract represents an employee’s perception of
“the mutual obligations that exist between the employee and his/her
42
organization.”
Psychological contracts emerge in organizations
when an employee perceives that the contribution she makes obligates
43
her employer to reciprocate. The psychological contract represents
the bundle of employee expectations that the employer will behave in
a certain fashion based upon promises or past practices. Research on
psychological contracts has largely focused on the perceptions and
44
expectations of employees.
In organizational behavior literature,
the word “contract” in psychological contract is used as a construct or
45
metaphor.
Psychological contracts are not legally enforceable
46
contracts.
Despite the disparity between contract and psychological contract,
psychological contract theory has a long history, originating from
social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, who described the
42 Jill Kickul & Scott W. Lester, Broken Promises: Equity Sensitivity as a Moderator
Between Psychological Contract Breach and Employee Attitudes and Behavior, 16 J. BUS.
& PSYCHOL. 191, 192 (2001). Professors Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly provide the
following definition: “The psychological contract is defined as an individual’s
expectations regarding the obligations that exist between an employee and an organization.
Psychological contracts involve only the employee’s beliefs and expectations; it is not
necessary that the other party in the exchange relationship share these expectations.”
Jonathan L. Johnson & Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly, The Effects of Psychological Contract
Breach and Organizational Cynicism: Not All Social Exchange Violations Are Created
Equal, 24 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 627, 628–29 (2003) (citation omitted).
43 See Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 42, at 629.
44 The perceptions of the employer relating to the psychological contract have also been
examined. See, e.g., Amanuel G. Tekleab & M. Susan Taylor, Aren’t There Two Parties
in an Employment Relationship? Antecedents and Consequences of Organization—
Employee Agreement on Contract Obligations and Violations, 24 J. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 585, 585–86 (2003) (noting the prevalence of employee-focused research and
focusing instead on employer perceptions).
45 Mark V. Roehling, The Origins and Early Development of the Psychological
Contract Construct, 3 J. MGMT. HIST. 204, 204 (1997).
46 See Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 42.
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47

presence of an overarching social contract.
This social contract
assumed that individuals living in a state of nature tacitly consent to
48
develop an organized civilization. The social contract constitutes a
reciprocal agreement between citizens and the state whereby the state
offers services in exchange for citizens paying taxes, shouldering
49
defense responsibilities, and obeying laws.
Management
researchers, beginning in the late 1950s, first described a
psychological contract through an inducement-contribution model,
whereby employees receive pay and benefit inducements in exchange
50
for contributions to the firm.
At the same time, a leading
psychiatrist of the time hypothesized that contractual relationships
involve the mutual satisfaction of the parties’ psychological needs,
such as the pleasure of companionship, in addition to the explicit
51
contractual exchange.
When the “psychological contract” term emerged in the early
1960s, scholars characterized it at the time as an implicit
understanding of terms between employees and employers. One
scholar observed that workers maintained high production levels with
minimal grievances in exchange for receiving fair wages and
52
treatment from their employer.
One scholar interviewed utility
company employees and learned that employees perceived their
53
employer to be duty bound to satisfy employee expectations.
As the psychological contract literature expanded, scholars
redefined the term from one expressing mutual obligations to a onesided perspective radiating from the expectations formed within the
54
minds of employees. This shift in focus coincided with significant
new trends in the workplace, including increased instances of
corporate restructuring; downsizing; and the use of contingent,

47

Roehling, supra note 45, at 205.
Id.
49 Id.
50 JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958) (discussing a
theory of formal organizations).
51 KARL MENNINGER, THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE 21 (1958).
52 CHRIS ARGYRIS, UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 96 (1960).
53 Roehling, supra note 45, at 207 (quoting HARRY LEVINSON ET AL., MEN,
MANAGEMENT, AND MENTAL HEALTH 20 (1962)).
54 Abigail Marks, Developing a Multiple Foci Conceptualization of the Psychological
Contract, 23 EMP. REL. 454, 455 (2001).
48
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55

temporary, or leased workers. Employees stuck in the old system of
56
career-long employment were the victims of widespread layoffs.
Psychological contracts today are believed to possess certain
characteristics. First, an employee’s psychological contract may not
57
be perceived as an obligation by the organization.
Second,
psychological contracts arise from both formal and informal cues.
These expectations often take the form of explicit oral promises or are
derived from company policies, but they may also originate from
58
casual statements, patterns of conduct, and implicit social signals.
Third, employees hold psychological contracts with multiple
constituencies, including various individual managers and the
59
organization as a whole. Finally, psychological contracts change as
60
the employee’s relationship with the organization grows over time.
These changes can result from task changes assigned by the
organization, entry of new management, shifting economic
conditions, and updated organizational policies.
Psychological contracts play an important role in employee
perceptions and decision making related to the workplace. This is
especially important given the increasingly unstable workplace that
modern employers have created over time, either inadvertently or by
61
design.
Cradle-to-grave employment for employees has largely
disappeared, thus creating significant uncertainty as to the meaning of

55 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & René Sacasas, Employee Leasing: No Panacea,
BUS. & ECON. REV., July–Sept. 1995, at 16 (examining legal issues relating to employee
leasing). The once-stable employment relationship that characterized the American
workplace was transformed into one characterized by job insecurity, increased employee
mobility, and ever-evolving skill sets. See Kenneth P. De Meuse et al., An Investigation of
the Relational Component of the Psychological Contract Across Time, Generation, and
Employment Status, 13 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 102, 102–03 (2001).
56 Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 551 (2001).
57 Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Sandra L. Robinson, When Employees Feel Betrayed: A
Model of How Psychological Contract Violation Develops, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 226,
228 (1997).
58 Jill Kickul & Matthew A. Liao-Troth, The Meaning Behind the Message: Climate
Perceptions and the Psychological Contract, 18 MID-AM. J. BUS. 23, 24 (2003).
59 Peter Herriot & Carole Pemberton, Contracting Careers, 49 HUM. REL. 757, 760–62
(1996).
60 De Meuse et al., supra note 55, at 102.
61 T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America: Private
Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495, 514–15
(2007); see Scott W. Fielding, Note, Free Competition or Corporate Theft?: The Need for
Courts to Consider the Employment Relationship in Preliminary Steps Disputes, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 201, 229 n.141 (1999).
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62

the employer-employee relationship.
One certainty is that the
corporate restructuring and downsizing policies implemented during
the 1980s and 1990s have significantly changed the employment
63
relationship.
These strategies have arguably miscalculated the
critical role that employees play in an organization’s long-term
64
Despite the changes in the nature of the employment
success.
relationship, the psychological contract continues to play an important
role, especially in the area of employee discharge.
As a result of employer insensitivity and lack of commitment to
retaining a loyal, long-term labor force, there is evidence of the
lowering of employee expectations. Employees’ expectations are
65
lower today than they were in generations past.
However, the
lowering of expectations does not mean the elimination of
expectations. As such, employers continue to break psychological
66
contracts. For example, one study discovered that as many as fiftyfive percent of recent MBA graduates believed that their employers
had broken their psychological contracts within the first two years of
67
employment.
Another study reported that twenty-five percent of
respondents, employees surveyed during a company restructuring,
68
An
reported significant psychological contract violations.
increasing number of today’s employees believe they have suffered
an injustice or have been treated unfairly by their employers.
Despite the many studies of employment at will and the
psychological contract, scholarship has not sufficiently illuminated
the underlying factors that influence employee attitudes during a
discharge. One can easily speculate that poorly treated employees are
more likely to react negatively to discharge, but the specific source of
the negative reaction remains unclear. Furthermore, there has been
insufficient research into what types of actions employers can take—
prior to and at the time of discharge—to mitigate an employee’s
negative reaction. No employee likes to be fired, but certain factors
62 Ronald R. Sims, Human Resource Management’s Role in Clarifying the New
Psychological Contract, 33 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 373, 374 (1994).
63 DeMeuse et al., supra note 55, at 102.
64 See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Seven Practices of Successful Organizations, 40 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 96, 97–100 (1998).
65 Bird, supra note 38, at 166.
66 Id.; Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 248.
67 Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract:
Not the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 245, 252 (1994).
68 William H. Turnley & Daniel C. Feldman, Psychological Contract Violations During
Corporate Restructuring, 37 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 71, 74 (1998).
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exist that can be manipulated by the employer to lessen the
psychological trauma of employees and reduce the legal costs to
employers.
Few workers find comfort in the knowledge that the loss of their
job keeps labor costs down and allows capital to flow to more
efficient companies or industries. Employment law’s at-will doctrine
provides a bright-line rule, but employees perceive the law as
providing protections, such as just-cause dismissal, that it in fact does
69
not provide.
The study presented here measures employee
perceptions of just and fair treatment at the termination of
employment and whether the perceptions of fair versus unfair
treatment predict employee responses to termination. Alternatively
stated, is the employer able to control the psychological contract in
order to minimize negative employee responses at termination?
The survey examines two broad areas relating to antecedents to
employment discharge and their effects on employee responses. First,
it examines whether the level of employee knowledge of the law of
employment impacts reactions to an employment discharge. Second,
the survey examines whether procedural safeguards in the discharge
process, as well as the substantive appropriateness of the discharge,
impact an individual’s reaction to an employment discharge. The
survey presented in this Article aims to address these important
questions. The next Part discusses the nature of the survey, including
methodology, findings, and results.
III
THE EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION SURVEY: DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND
FINDINGS
The present study provides the findings of a written, empirical
survey of 763 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory
management course. Participants were randomly provided one of
70
twelve discharge scenarios.
All twelve scenarios expressed
variations of three key variables: (1) procedural fairness–procedural
unfairness, (2) substantive fairness–substantive unfairness, and (3) no
71
information-cueing–education of employee on employment law.

69 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL. L. REV. 105 (1997).
70 See infra Appendix A for a sampling of the discharge scenarios.
71 Id.
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The first variable examined is the impact of procedural fairness or
unfairness on employment discharge reactions. For purposes of this
Article, procedural fairness is the concept of whether an employment
72
discharge decision incorporated justice-related factors.
For
example, procedural fairness might involve the opportunity to be
heard and an open and fair evaluation of the necessity for the
discharge before the employer reaches the decision to terminate. This
should be followed by a reasonable amount of advance notice of
discharge.
In this survey, we manipulated procedural fairness through the
production of two different scenarios. One scenario given was
73
procedurally fair.
The first paragraph explained the available
74
The second
procedural rights in the company employee manual.
paragraph showed that the process of discharge outlined in the
employment manual was followed completely and provided a number
75
of opportunities for review and improvement.
The other scenario treated the employee with procedural
76
unfairness.
The first paragraph was identical to the procedurally
fair scenario in that it described the rights the employee possessed in
77
the company employment manual.
But, the second paragraph
described the actual employee’s treatment as involving standards of
evaluation and a shorter notice of discharge, contrary to the policies
78
set out in the company manual.
The second variable involved the impact of substantive fairness on
employment discharge reactions. Substantive fairness, a related
concept to substantive justice, “focuses on the fairness or

72 See, e.g., David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design
Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008)
(“‘[P]rocedural justice’ involves the extent to which citizens value a process because of its
procedural features.”); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128
(1988) (defining “procedural justice” as a measurement of participants' satisfaction with
the decision-making processes underlying a particular decision).
73 See infra Appendix A § 1.1.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See id. § 1.2.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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79

appropriateness of a procedure’s outcomes.” Substantive fairness is
concerned with whether the ultimate employment decision made was
correct. A substantively fair result would be the case where the
discharge was based on a “good” reason, such as incompetence or
insubordination. Where procedural fairness focuses on just process,
substantive fairness focuses on just outcomes.
Substantive fairness was manipulated in a fashion similar to
procedural fairness, with the presentation of one scenario highlighting
a substantively fair decision and another depicting a substantively
80
unfair decision. In the fair scenario, the survey described a situation
81
In the
where the employee was fired for poor job performance.
unfair scenario, the employee was discharged because she is
82
overweight.
The third variable was designed to examine the impact of
educating employees about available legal rights. Survey respondents
were presented with one of three scenarios, varying according to the
amount of legal information provided. The first scenario, which was
used as a control variable, provided no legal information at all to the
83
respondent.
Instead, the respondent was given information about
the firm’s size and competitive position unrelated to employment
84
law.
The second scenario provided limited information at the time of
hire about employment discharge, which was defined in the study as
85
cueing.
In the cueing scenario, respondents were told about the
employment-at-will rule and were informed about exceptions to
employment at will that can arise from company policies and
86
employee handbooks.
The cueing prompt also informed
87
respondents about the duty of employers to act in good faith. The

79 Markell & Tyler, supra note 72. See generally Nancy Ehrenreich, Foreword:
Conceptualizing Substantive Justice, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 533 (2010) (exploring
broader definitions of substantive justice).
80 See infra Appendix A § 2.
81 Id. § 2.1.
82 Id. § 2.2.
83 Id. § 3.1.
84 Id.
85 Id. § 3.2.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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prompt raised the possibility that an insincere reason for firing can
88
“lead to a claim of ‘wrongful discharge.’”
89
In this
The third and final scenario was the educating prompt.
prompt, all prior information about employment at will and its
90
exceptions were provided to the survey participant. In addition to
this material, however, the educating prompt explained that firms can
91
disclaim company policy statements implying discharge protection.
A clause found in the firm’s employee handbook was then provided
92
to the respondent. The clause disclaimed all employee protections
93
against at-will termination.
Once a particular procedural condition (procedural fairness or
unfairness), substantive condition (substantive fairness or unfairness),
and law condition (control, cueing, or educating) was provided to a
94
respondent, the respondent received a questionnaire.
The
questionnaire inquired, in part, about the respondent’s attitudes
95
Respondents
toward the company given the scenario provided.
were asked about their litigation intentions, specifically, whether they
96
would consider legal action against the employer. The core thesis
of this Article is not that such intentions are realistic responses from
frustrated employees, but that these reactions may be muted or
amplified by the conditions surrounding the discharge and the
97
employee’s knowledge of the law.
88 Id. This is a broad reading of the limitations imposed by exceptions to employment
at will, as employers are not required to give sincere rationales for every discharge. See,
e.g., Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Intentional Misrepresentation in Hiring and
the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2006); Barbara
Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects on Employees—Adaptation of the Tort of
Wrongful Discharge, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 362, 373 (1986) (“Strict adherence to the
employment-at-will doctrine in the business closing context would mean that an employer
could plan to close its place of business, misrepresent this plan by giving the employees
false assurances of job security, use the workers' fear of job loss as a lever to extract
concessions from them, and then close as originally planned with no liability to the
employees.”).
89 See infra Appendix A § 3.3.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See infra Appendix B.
95 The questions presented in Appendix B were excerpted from a lengthier
questionnaire examining other topics such as task performance, citizenship behavior, and
withdrawal behavior. The full survey is on file with the authors.
96 See infra Appendix B.
97 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance
in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 983 (1999)
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As a result of this survey design, we proposed six hypotheses for
testing. These hypotheses can be grouped into two categories:
Knowledge Hypotheses and Fairness Hypotheses.
The three
Knowledge Hypotheses are expressed as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The control variable involves scenarios where
employees were provided no information on the law of
employment. Hypothesis 1 proposes that employees with no
knowledge (and provided no information) of employee discharge
law (the employment-at-will doctrine) are the most likely to pursue
litigation and retaliation against their employer at the time of
termination compared to those cued or educated on employment
discharge law.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Employees who are cued as to the employmentat-will doctrine at the time of hire are less likely to pursue litigation
than those with no knowledge of employment law.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Employees who are more fully educated by the
employer at the time of hire are even less likely to pursue litigation
than those who are simply cued as to the employment-at-will
doctrine.

The Knowledge Hypotheses and Fairness Hypotheses were both
tested with analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA compared
the mean levels of litigation intentions across the procedural fairness,
substantive fairness, and law conditions. With respect to the latter,
the results revealed significant mean differences for litigation
intentions across the control, cueing, and educating conditions:
98
F(2,763) = 2.94, p<.05. However, most of that effect was due to the
educating condition.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in
relationship to the education variable but was only marginally
correlated in relationship to the cueing variable. In the end, the
cueing variable reduced the rate of retaliation, but not by a
statistically significant amount.
Hypothesis 3 was supported,
however, in that respondents who were more thoroughly educated by
the employer at the time of hire were less likely to pursue litigation
(giving a trade publication’s ominous warning that “[a]ll too often, terminated employees
will retaliate against their former employers by bringing frivolous discrimination lawsuits”
(citing John J. Myers, Reduce the Risk of Frivolous Lawsuits, in GETTING RESULTS…FOR
THE HANDS-ON MANAGER, Oct. 1997, at 7)); Francoise Gilbert, Seven Drivers for Privacy
& Security Issues in a Down Economy, 13 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (2009) (“Disgruntled
employees may retaliate or express their anger with the lay-offs by attempting criminal
actions against the company's databases. . . . In other cases, disgruntled employees have
accessed the company's databases and modified or destroyed personal data or introduced
viruses or malware into the systems.”).
98 See infra figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the pattern of results.
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than the participants in either the control or cueing conditions. One
can surmise that the greater the amount of education, with cueing
being viewed as a superficial form of education, the lower the rate of
litigation.
99
In sum, the data confirmed two of the three hypotheses proposed.
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in that respondents who were educated
were less likely to consider litigation than the respondents who were
100
provided no information about the employment-at-will doctrine.
In
the absence of such experience or other knowledge, the respondents
would likely apply their own “fairness heuristic” to the discharge
hypothetical. Individuals use a fairness heuristic when they lack clear
objective criteria for evaluating the propriety of a particular
101
decision.
In the absence of such criteria, individuals form fairness
102
This is
judgments from whatever information is readily available.
particularly true when decisions have to be made quickly (such as in a
survey). The heuristic provides a shortcut to decision making for
103
someone not possessing full information.
Such a heuristic “frees
up cognitive resources and [provides] confidence in” the decision or
104
action reached.
Fairness heuristics can also be used as a shortcut to
105
decide whether a particular authority can be trusted.

99

See infra figure 1.
Undergraduate students, the respondents in this survey, are not likely to have a
working knowledge of the doctrine of employment at will.
101 Russell Cropanzano et al., Moral Virtues, Fairness Heuristics, Social Entities, and
Other Denizens of Organizational Justice, 58 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 164, 170 (2001).
102 Id.
103 See id.
104 Id.
105 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems
for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 39–40 (2008).
100
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as unjust and worthy of retaliation or litigation behaviors, respondents
may have perceived the discharge less negatively because it did not
deviate substantially from the legal rules on which they were
educated. The implication is that when the respondents were made
more fully aware of the limited nature of employment protections,
they demonstrated a lower propensity or desire to take action against
the discharging firm.
To reemphasize, in the “educated” respondent scenario, as noted
earlier, respondents are told that a disclaimer in an employee manual
107
can override other assurances of long-term employment.
The
108
In
respondents are then told that the firm has such a disclaimer.
fact, the disclaimer is rather detailed and conspicuous, comprising a
bolded ninety words, which in essence informs the reader that even
though a manual with policies exists, it is not binding on the
109
employer.
The disclaimer clause also states that the employer can
110
Perhaps
amend or terminate the policies and benefits at any time.
the scenario is evidence of the power of disclaimers when properly
presented to new hires. In the education scenario, the company
111
representatives discuss the disclaimer and its legality.
The key factor is likely not the disclaimer itself, but how it was
presented and explained. Without such a presentation and thorough
explanation of the disclaimer and how it relates to company policies
and employment termination, the firm’s treatment of legal rights may
be construed as invidious in nature. An employer who emphasizes its
company’s pro-employee benefits and polices, but at the same time
“hides” or fails to explain the termination-at-will disclaimer, will
likely be viewed by the employee as misrepresenting firm policies.
Such policies provide a false but intended illusion that the firm is a
112
fair and equitable organization.
The manual acts as a prod for
107 See infra Appendix A § 3.3. See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks
and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326 (1992); Natalie Bucciarelli
Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts Interpret Employee
Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101 (2008); Cynthia Weber
Scherb, Note, The Use of Disclaimers to Avoid Employer Liability Under Employee
Handbook Provisions, 12 J. CORP. L. 105 (1986).
108 See infra Appendix A § 3.3.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Joseph Lawson, Give your Employees a Hand (Book), LEGAL MGMT., Nov.–Dec.
1999, at 24, 32 (“In an era of increasing litigation, having clearly written and
communicated guidelines will help ensure a professional, equitable environment that can
protect a professional service firm from legal liability.”). The trade publication also
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unsuspecting employees to construct a normative-relational mindset
of the employer-employee contract that in fact does not legally exist.
This scenario allows the company to project positive signals of trust
by promising benefits without undertaking any obligation to provide
those benefits.
Purposeful evasion of the existence of the disclaimer clause at the
time of hire is likely to produce unintended consequences. First, on
the legal side, courts may construe the continuance of polices that are
contrary to at-will employment, especially when reinforced post-hire,
as working a modification of the initial employment-at-will nature of
the relationship.
Second, without a full explanation of the
relationship between the disclaimer and the company’s employeefriendly policies relating to termination, the employee may process
the multitude of employee-friendly policies to create a false
perception of the firm as one that is committed to the nurturing of
long-term employer-employee relationships. The study shows that a
fuller explanation (education) significantly reduces employees’ rates
of retaliation and litigation. The conjecture here is that if not done
properly, the cognitive dissonance between the firm’s employeefriendly policies and a subsequent strict use of employment at will is
likely to heighten negative attitudes toward the organization.
Employees wittingly or unwittingly perceive the diminishment of
employee valuation as a breach of the underlying understanding
(psychological contract) between the employer and the employee. In
hindsight, the employee perceives the dissonance of the marketing by
the employer of an employee-friendly relationship and strict
enforcement of employment at will as a type of misrepresentation or
fraud perpetuated by the firm. The sense of being tricked or betrayed
results in the ex-employee viewing the firm more negatively at the
time of discharge.
As explained earlier, we also tested the reactions of respondents to
various fairness-related scenarios. We express the set of three
Fairness Hypotheses as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 4: Employees who experience procedural fairness
will be less likely to pursue litigation than employees who
experience procedural unfairness.
HYPOTHESIS 5: Employees who experience substantive fairness
will be less likely to pursue litigation than employees who
experience substantive unfairness.
explains that employee handbooks can promote a better understanding of a firm’s policies,
increase consistency and credibility, and enhance recruitment. Id. at 26–30.
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HYPOTHESIS 6: Employees who experience the combination of
procedural fairness and substantive fairness will be less likely to
pursue litigation than employees experiencing only procedural
fairness or only substantive fairness.

The Fairness Hypotheses were tested with the same ANOVA. The
results revealed significant mean differences for litigation intentions
across the two procedural conditions: F(1,763) = 72.60, p<.001.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, employees who experienced procedural
fairness had lower litigation intentions (mean = 2.50) than employees
who experienced procedural unfairness (mean = 3.12). It should be
noted that the study conceived procedural fairness purely as a process.
In the scenarios, the employee handbook clearly describes the process
that would be followed prior to termination, including (1) a six-month
review with notice if the evaluation is considered as substandard—the
notice would suggest that the employee seek guidance from the
human resource department or the company’s informal mentoring
program, (2) a second six-month review—if the second review
includes another substandard review notice, then the employee is
given a three-month probationary period in order to improve, and a
senior manager is assigned as a mentor, and finally, (3) upon the
determination of continued substandard performance, the employee is
given a two-week notice of discharge. If the employer follows this
process as expressed to the employee, then this is construed as a case
of procedural fairness. The study does not measure interactional
justice, which relates to treatment and not to the specifics of the
113
process.
Studies have shown that procedural fairness as a predictor
of employee outcomes can be negatively affected if the employee
feels mistreated or disrespected during the implementation of the
114
procedures.
In addition, the previous study concluded that
procedural fairness is most effective when the breach relates to
extrinsic values (pay, rewards), while interactive fairness is a key
factor when the breach involves intrinsic values (projects,
113 See Jill Kickul et al., Promise Breaking During Radical Organizational Change: Do
Justice Interventions Make a Difference?, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 469, 472
(2002) [hereinafter Promise Breaking]. The importance of interactional justice is not to be
downplayed and its impact has been measured in other studies. See, e.g., Jill R. Kickul et
al., Settling the Score: The Role of Organizational Justice in the Relationship Between
Psychological Contract Breach and Anticitizenship Behavior, 13 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J.
77 (2001) [hereinafter Settling the Score] (interactional injustice positively correlated to
increased levels of anticitizenship behavior).
114 Kickul, Lester & Finkl note that interactional justice in the case of a psychological
contract breaches include “sensitivity, concern, empathy, and above all else respect to . . .
[the] disgruntled employees.” Promise Breaking, supra note 113, at 485.
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The survey also confirmed Hypothesis 6. A combination of
procedural and substantive fairness produced an interaction effect in
120
the ANOVA: F(1, 763) = 22.31, p<.001.
The presence of both
types of fairness amplified the rate of decrease in litigation pursued
by discharged employees. Some studies indicate that procedural
justice accounts for more variance than distributive justice in
121
predicting work-related attitudes.
However, Greenberg stresses
that “the real issue is not which form of justice is more important but
122
The current study supports this
how they operate together.”
supposition by showing the synergistic effects that occur when
procedural fairness is combined with substantive fairness. When
substantive fairness exists, the effects of procedural fairness amplify
perceptions of company fairness. The amplification effect is shown
in Figure 2. The lighter-shaded columns show higher rates of
retaliation intentions without the amplification effect. The darkershaded columns show that substantive fairness lowered the rate of
retaliation in relation to cases of substantive unfairness. Both
columns on the right show the amplified effect. The lighter column
on the right shows cases of substantive fairness combined with
procedural unfairness; the darker column on the right shows a drastic
reduction in the rate of retaliation when there is combined substantive
and procedural fairness. The rate of retaliation in the amplified
scenario is nearly one-half of the rate when there is substantive and
procedural unfairness. Put simply, substantive fairness without
procedural fairness positively, but moderately, impacts the fairness
attitudes of the firm’s employees. Substantive or procedural fairness
alone only moderately reduce litigiousness.
Substantive and
procedural fairness together produce substantial reductions in rates of
litigation and retaliation. Finally, in cases where procedural fairness
existed, employees that received no information of their rights under
employment law showed higher rates of litigation propensity than
those who were educated.

120

See figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the pattern of results.
See, e.g., Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and
Distributive Justice in Organizational Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 177 (1987).
122 GREENBERG, supra note 116, at 403.
121
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IV
NORMS IN CONTRACT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
The study focused on the roles of knowledge communication and
fairness in affecting employees’ perceptions at the time of
termination. The findings support claims that employees’ perceptions
of their employers at the time of termination are heavily affected by
perceptions of fairness, and to a lesser extent, by knowledge transfer.
The findings also support an ancillary proposition that the employer
can manipulate the employees’ perceptions of fair termination
through practices of education, procedural justice practices, and by
providing fair rationales for dismissal. Parts IV and V extrapolate
from these findings to analyze the similarities between legal
employment contracts and psychological contracts. The importance
of norms to both contract law and employment relationships will be
explored in this Part. The prominent role played by the fairness norm
in creating expectations both psychologically and legally will provide
the common ground in analyzing the role that psychological contract
theory can play in reforming employment law. The importance of
expectations and the ability to manage expectations will be explored
in Part V. Finally, the importance of norms and expectations as
represented by the psychological contract, and their affinity to the
norms of contract law, will be used in Part VI to justify reforms to the
law of employment. The means to reform are found in existing
structures within the law of contracts. The suggested guide for
reforming employment law is through a process of aligning the norms
and expectations of contract law with those of the psychological
contract.
A. Norms and Contract Law
One theme that is common to legal employment contracts and
psychological contracts is that each has a normative basis. One way
of explaining the differences between legal employment contracts and
psychological contracts is that they are based upon different norms.
However, this would be a premature assessment of their normative
frameworks. Most of the norms that underlie the psychological
contract are found in relational contract theory, and most of the norms
in relational contract theory are recognized, in some form or degree,
in mainstream contract law. The difference is that the strength of
relational norms found in the psychological contract is more
pronounced than the application of those norms in contract law.
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Alternatively stated, the composite of norms that underlie legal and
psychological contracts possess the same ingredients but in varying
123
degrees.
The employment-at-will doctrine is closely related to the
predominate norm that contract law is expected to advance—freedom.
124
In macro terms, capitalism is based upon a private ordering system.
Contract law is the primary means by which private ordering shapes
the economy and society. Individuals and entities are free to agree to
any terms in the formation of a contract. In the event that the bargain
struck is one-sided (unfair), it is not contract law’s role to make the
contract more fair or equitable. Instead, the contract, barring major
125
bargaining failures, is strictly enforced. Hence, if an employer and
employee enter into an employment-at-will contract, then the at-will
nature of the contract should be strictly enforced.
Even though the freedom-of-contract principle is the dominant
126
norm, it is only one of many norms that underlie contract law.
The
rationales for contract law stem from a composite that includes the
norms of autonomy, fairness, justice, reliance, predictability,
127
certainty, efficiency, and the morality of promise keeping.
The composite or parts of the composite are used to justify
particular rules or principles of contract law. The norms also are
used, often implicitly, in the application of contract rules to actual
cases. Ultimately, the composite of norms listed above can be
distilled into often competing metanorms of private autonomy
(freedom of contract) and fairness of the exchange. Justice Cardozo
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907
(1996) (arguing that social norms can be used to advance legal objectives).
124 The employment relationship’s at-will principle masks a general tension between the
view of employment relationships at the sole creation of market economics and the
conception of the relationship as one dominated by the employer. See Clyde W. Summers,
Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 65 (2000) (arguing that employee-related protections are insufficient).
125 Bargaining flaws primarily relate to the genuineness of consent. Contracts are
legally enforceable agreements. As such, the parties must mutually consent to the
bindingness of the agreement and to the terms of the agreement. If there is no mutual
assent, then there can be no contract. Such consent may be seen as present at the time of
the agreement, but a court may later determine that the consent was flawed. The presence
of mutual mistake as to the subject of the contract, a unilateral mistake that the nonmistaken party could not have been unaware, duress or undue influence used by one party
over the other, and misrepresentation by one of the parties are all means to challenge the
genuineness of consent and thereby determine if the contract is enforceable.
126 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law
of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 435 (1995).
127 Id.
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described law as a process of resolving the inner tension between
freedom and fairness as one in which “[t]he social interest served by
symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the social
128
interest served by equity and fairness.”
The psychological contract
is built upon the fairness norm that is embedded in contract law. The
principle of private autonomy is the basis of the employment-at-will
principle. The fairness or justice norm is the rationale used to support
the legal exceptions to employment at will.
B. Relational Contract Norms and the Psychological Contract
129

is the
Relational contract theory, as espoused by Ian Macneil,
130
foundation upon which psychological contract theory rests.
Macneil’s key insight is that enforceable and unenforceable contracts
are formed within a larger relational and social context. The larger
relational or social exchange is based on a cadre of norms not found
in classical contract law, such as the norms of reciprocity,
cooperation, and solidarity. The cooperation and solidarity norms
reflect the complexity of long-term, relational contracts. This
complexity and the changeable nature of such relationships suggest
that both parties expect to cooperate in order to preserve the common
purposes of the contract (solidarity). Macneil states that the
“[p]ossibility of trouble [is] anticipated as [a] normal part of
relation[al contracts], to be dealt with by cooperation and other
131
restorational techniques.”
Within the notion of restorational
techniques, the norm of reciprocity can be used to restore the
relationship by each party giving up something or giving an additional
something.
However, one study showed that employees are
instrumental and not reciprocal in their perceptions of the changing
132
obligations of the psychological contract over time.
The study
128

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
For an understanding of Macneil’s view, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). See also David
Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in THE RELATIONAL
THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3 (David Campbell ed.,
2001).
130 Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau state that “Macneil’s typology of contracts can be
used to categorize psychological contracts.” Sandra L. Robinson, Matthew S. Kraatz &
Denise M. Rousseau, Changing Obligations and the Psychological Contract: A
Longitudinal Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 138 (1994) (citation omitted).
131 Macneil, supra note 129, at 740.
132 Robinson, Kraatz & Rousseau, supra note 130, at 147.
129
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showed that employees perceived their obligations under the
psychological contract to decrease as their employer’s obligations
increased. This type of one-sidedness questions the normative
viability of the psychological contract and whether it would be
prudent for employment law to recognize the breach of the
psychological contract to support employee-generated litigation.
Professor Robert Hillman acknowledges that the basket of classical
contract norms needs to be expanded to include the different
normative basis of relational contracts: “[R]elational norms such as
cooperation and compromise, rather than promises, largely govern
133
these parties’ associations.”
Indeed, the relational norms of
planning, trust, and solidarity have moved into the mainstream of
contract law. They can be seen at work in collaborative alliances,
134
franchising, and joint venturing.
It is in this space between
classical contract law’s recognition of enforceable contracts and the
different normative grounding associated with unenforceable
relational contracts that psychological contract theory resides.
There is a deep literature on the role of social norms in producing
appropriate decisions and actions. A theme in this literature is that a
norm may be a more effective means of controlling bad behavior or
135
encouraging good behavior than the use of law.
The psychological
contract can be simply thought of as a bundle or basket of norms at
least partially created by the employer. When the employer follows
these norms there is little necessity for litigation. However, when the
employer violates the norms of employment, then the mantra of
injustice or unfairness increases the likelihood of litigation and
retaliation. The breach of the psychological contract is, in essence, a
violation of relational norms embedded in certain employment
relationships. The effect of an employer establishing (beginning at
the commencement of employment) social norms of fairness and
justice is likely to raise employee expectations of just and fair
136
termination.
Just as conformity to norms decreases the need for
133 Robert A. Hillman, Essay, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV.
103, 124 (1988).
134 See Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727 (2010).
135 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 288 (2001).
136 One commentator argues that a norm of no discharge without cause currently exists.
Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in
Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307 (2002).
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law or for litigation, violation of the norms increases the likelihood of
litigation and the need for legal protections for employees.
C. Analyzing the Psychological Contract as a Two-Way Exchange
The norms of fairness or justice provide the strongest normative
support for the psychological contract. After about two decades,
however, the psychological contract literature has not fully explored
137
the duality of expectations that form the psychological contract.
Instead, it has focused solely upon the expectations of the employee.
The research has failed to recognize that for every breach of the
psychological contract by the employer there is a corresponding
psychological breach that relates to the employee. This becomes
clear when we use reasonableness as a surrogate for fairness. The
two-way analysis of the psychological contract rests upon a simple
premise that someone who is acting unreasonably toward another is
also being unfair. This simple premise leads to a two-step process in
assessing expectations.
First, does a party possess certain
expectations?
Second, are these expectations the product of
reasonable perceptions—ones that a vast majority of similarly situated
persons would possess?
In order to explain the logic of the above paragraph, an analogy to
employment termination will be used.
The termination of
employment can be analogized to the cessation of long-term
contracts. The difference between the two is that a cessation of a
long-term contract may be due to a breach of a legal contract, while
the termination of a long-term employee may be only a breach of a
psychological contract. Professor Hillman notes that when the right
to cessation of a contract is unclear, a “further investigation into the
138
meaning of fairness in the cessation context” is required.
Hillman elaborates that the fairness norm is, in fact, a number of
interrelated norms. Three of these norms relate well to determining
the reasonableness of a psychological contract. The first norm that

137 “[R]eseachers view the psychological contract as held by [the] employee[] alone.”
Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 229. There are studies that measure employer, as
well as employee perspectives of the psychological contract and subsequent breaches.
They mostly confirm that there is considerable incongruence relating to the contract and
regarding how a breach is perceived. See, e.g., Scott W. Lester et al., Not Seeing Eye to
Eye: Differences in Supervisor and Subordinate Perceptions of and Attributions for
Psychological Contract Breach, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39 (2002).
138 Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 618 (1983).
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relates to the psychological contract is closest to what most feel when
they consider the fairness of an action: “[A] party should not
139
The
knowingly cause harm to another without justification.”
psychological contract literature assumes this to mean that the
employer should not terminate an employee without justification. In
the present study, the duty not to cause unnecessary harm is captured
by the existence of substantive and procedural fairness. It is
important to note that the employee can also breach the psychological
contract by acting unreasonably in causing harm to the employer
through litigation or retaliation. In contract law, the determination of
reasonableness is made by applying the reasonable person
140
standard.
The reasonable person standard could be used to
determine whether the employee’s perceptions or expectations were
unreasonable.
If they are considered unreasonable, then any
subsequent litigation or retaliation may be a post hoc breach of the
psychological contract by the employee.
The reasonable person standard applies to both transactional
(discrete) and relational contracts. The difference is that the
fabrication of the reasonable person in a relational contract uses
additional inputs. The transactional reasonable person is placed in the
shoes of a party at the time of formation. The reasonable person is
imbued with the characteristics of that party and the context at the
time of formation. A relational reasonable person in the employment
setting is placed in a chain of contexts beginning at the time of hiring
to the termination of the employment. The termination of an
employee is viewed not as an isolated act, but as one act within a
more expansive relationship. Professor James Gordley asserts that
through such an expanded analysis the reasonable person must decide
141
whether “[t]he parties willed a certain normative relationship.”
This is as close as contract law gets to the idea of the psychological
contract.
The second norm from Hillman’s typology is “that a party must act
142
reasonably to avoid harming” himself or herself.
In the case of the
psychological contract, the disgruntled employee may fail to take
139

Id. at 619.
See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293 (1997) (tracing the
history and the make-up of the standard).
141 JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE
241 (1991).
142 Hillman, supra note 133, at 619.
140
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positive action to limit her harm. The mitigation principle in contract
143
An
law requires the non-breaching party to mitigate her damages.
example of mitigation avoidance in the employment realm is when an
ex-employee does not utilize employer benefits that would aid in job
seeking or fails to actively look for another job. If she does not, then
the employer is relieved from any obligations regarding the harm that
could have been mitigated. This is especially true when the harm is at
least partially caused by the unreasonable expectations of the
employee.
The final fairness norm involves the determination of overall cost
and benefits of the employment relationship. This is the reciprocity
norm. Research in the psychological contract literature demonstrates
144
the bidirectional nature of the norm of reciprocity.
The fulfillment
of perceived employer obligations triggers a feeling of the need to
reciprocate by the employee. Conversely, an employer’s failure to
fulfill its obligations is likely to trigger a reciprocal response by the
employee. More likely, the causal flow is in the direction of
employee to employer. An example of a lack of reciprocity is when
the employee goes beyond the performance of minimally required
obligations and the employer fails to reciprocate. But given the
relational nature of employment, a single case of a lack of reciprocity
should be placed in the context of overall reciprocity. If the
psychological contract is relational, then overall reciprocity during the
course of the employment should be factored into the fairness
determination. If at the time of termination the employee has
received a net benefit attributed to the employment, then the breachof-psychological-contract approach loses some of its explanatory and
normative power. Psychological contracts aside, if the employee is
better off due to that particular employment relationship, then it
becomes more difficult to see the harm caused by the breach of a
psychological contract from the perspective of the entire relationship.
The fairness and justice norms are not necessarily on the side of the
discharged employee. An example of this is where an employee
obtains marketable training or skill sets during the employment.
John Kotter stresses that the psychological contract includes
potentially thousands of items and therefore divergence of employer
143 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.22, at 609, § 12.8, at 786, § 12.12, at 807
(3d ed. 1999).
144 See, e.g., Jacqueline A-M. Coyle-Shapiro & Ian Kessler, Exploring Reciprocity
Through the Lens of the Psychological Contract: Employee and Employer Perspectives,
11 EUR. J. WORK & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 69 (2002).

DIMATTEO

484

1/31/2012 1:37 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 449

145

and employee expectations is inevitable.
Given that assumption,
the psychological contract can be seen as a bundle of matched and
unmatched expectations.
When the employer and employee
expectations match, recognition of a breach of the psychological
contract is both evident and reasonable. In the case of unmatched
expectations, the employee’s expectations should be required to reach
a threshold of reasonableness before being recognized as a breach of
the psychological contract. A similar template is found in contract
law. The matching of expectations (reasonable interpretations of
reciprocal promises) is the foundation of a binding contract.
In cases where only one party (the employer) makes a promise, a
cause of action for promissory estoppel is available when the
146
promisee (the employee) reasonably relies upon the promise.
Contract law’s theory of promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance
encompasses another element found in the psychological contract and
justice literatures. The main rationale for promissory estoppel is the
prevention of injustice. The requirements of promissory estoppel are
the giving of a promise or assurance, reasonable reliance, and a
resulting injustice in the event that the court fails to provide a
147
remedy.
Courts resort to promissory estoppel when an element
needed to find an enforceable contract is missing.
Promissory estoppel is used when not providing a remedy of some
sort would cause an injustice. This may be the case when a promise
given by an employer, within the context of an at-will contract, results
in the employee reasonably and detrimentally relying on the promise.
An example would be when an employer makes a promise to
discourage an employee from taking a job with a competitor. After
retaining the employee, the employer then fails to honor its promise.
If the employee can prove damages—for example, that the other job
was higher paying or provided additional benefits—then a cause of
action in promissory estoppel is supported.
Promissory estoppel and the recognition of a violation of a
psychological contract both seek to address the feeling of injustice
produced by a breach of express or implied promises. The essence of
psychological contract theory is that even if there is no breach of a
145 See John Paul Kotter, The Psychological Contract: Managing the Joining-Up
Process, 15 CAL. MGMT. REV. 91, 92 (1973).
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
147 Id. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981) (analyzing the
Restatement’s embrace of detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel).
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legal employment contract, the breach of a psychological contract
may result in injustice or at least a perception of injustice. Feelings of
injustice are likely to elicit an emotional reaction and lead to
148
employee actions against the employer.
From an employer
perspective, it is in its best interest to recognize this injustice in order
to prevent it or provide a remedy for the harm caused. This
recognition advances the interests of both the employee and the
employer. Perceptions of injustice generate costs for the employer,
such as increased litigation costs, reputational costs, and retaliation
costs. In the end, contract law’s principle of promissory estoppel is a
much better construct on which to base psychological contract theory.
However, there is a major difference between the two. Promissory
estoppel requires the reliance to be reasonable. The psychological
contract literature generally does not distinguish between reasonable
and unreasonable employee perceptions and expectations.
D. Norms and Perceptions of Injustice
From an employer perspective, it is important to discover the
underlying conditions or factors that influence or predict discharged
employees’ propensities to act against the firm. A variety of personal
characteristics can influence a person’s proclivity toward retaliatory
behavior, such as beliefs that others are malevolent, an inclination
149
toward anger, and general personal anxiety.
While these behaviors
may be beyond the reasonable control of the employer, employers can
influence important factors relevant to an employee’s propensity to
retaliate. For example, the employer can construct discharge policies
that increase the dignity and respect given to the discharged
employee, increase the awareness of employees of the company’s
employment policies at the time of entry and during employment,
provide an “adequate” explanation for the discharge—one grounded
in the notion of substantive fairness—, and use due process
150
mechanisms leading up to the termination.
Our study showed that the fairness norm underlies the feelings of
injustice that an employee feels at the time of termination. The study
indicates that procedural fairness and substantive fairness are
148 See Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 250 (distinguishing between perceived
breach and violation).
149 See Eisenberger et al., supra note 11, at 788.
150 Benjamin B. Dunford & Dennis J. Devine, Employment At-Will and Employee
Discharge: A Justice Perspective on Legal Action Following Termination, 51 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 903, 922 (1998).
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predictors of employees’ actions at termination relating to intent to
sue or retaliate. A combination of the two forms of fairness amplified
the predictive power of employees’ reactions. The unanswered
question is whether the employer’s fairness needs to be genuine to be
effective. Professor Greenberg labels the manipulation of fairness as
151
He comments that the problem with
an act of “hollow justice.”
such a divergence is that “[a] perceived intentional ‘using’ of fairness
152
as a tool of manipulation is likely to backfire.”
It would seem that
the effectiveness of manipulated fairness is dependent on the quality
of the manipulation. However, perceptions of fairness, like trust and
loyalty, are affected throughout the course of the employment. If an
employee perceives her employer as being unfair, for example, by not
treating similarly situated employees equally during the course of
employment, it will be difficult for an employer to manipulate
fairness factors to change established perceptions of unfairness. In
the area of procedural fairness, process is inherently longitudinal in
nature. The perception of procedural fairness is based upon the
fairness of the employer’s practices and policies throughout the
duration of the employment. It is difficult to envision that procedural
fairness at termination can be manipulated to overcome a history of
procedural unfairness—such as favoritism in promotion and benefits,
inequitable application of company policies and practices, and not
providing the means for the employee to succeed.
Finally, substantive fairness is more subject to manipulation than
procedural fairness. The perception that the employer has a goodfaith reason for the termination, especially those tied to external
factors like the economy, explains its predictive power over rates of
litigation and retaliation. However, if procedural fairness is not
provided, it is likely that the employee will see the good-faith reason
as a sham masking an arbitrary or bad-faith dismissal. The fact that
the study showed an amplified effect when procedural and substantive
fairness are both present supports the premise that the two forms of
fairness are interrelated, at least in the area of employment
termination.

151
152

GREENBERG, supra note 116, at 132–33.
Id.
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V
KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTIONS, AND EXPECTATIONS
This Part examines the role of knowledge, perceptions, and
expectations in the election by an employee to litigate or retaliate. It
first analyzes the interrelationship between an employee’s perceptions
of employment law and the fairness of the employer’s action to
terminate. This Part then examines the concept of the internal versus
external employment relationship. It concludes with an assessment of
the ability of best practices to condition employee expectations and
perceptions.
A. Employees’ Perceptions of Employment Law and Employer
Fairness
Employees’ expectations relating to job security and the
employer’s rights to terminate may actually be formed prior to the
commencement of employment. The focus here is on the perceptions
of employment law that employees possess a priori and whether those
perceptions can be changed at the commencement of employment.
Fortunately, there are empirical studies that have provided insight into
employee perceptions of the protections provided under employment
153
law.
The key finding is that employees perceive that the law
154
Implied
provides protection against arbitrary or unfair discharge.
in these perceptions is the belief that an employer may only discharge
155
an employee for just cause.
These perceptions are patently false
yet continue to persist. The most plausible explanation for this
divergence between perception and reality is provided by behavioral
decision theory. It has been shown that most individuals possess a
number of biases and heuristic tools that they bring to most
relationships, such as marriage, contract relationships, and
156
employment relationships.
Pauline Kim showed that employees’ perception of employment
157
law is deeply flawed.
Kim’s study measured the beliefs that

153

E.g., Kim, supra note 69.
Id. at 106.
155 Id. at 136.
156 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
1, 3–9 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (reviewing list of biases and heuristics); Christine Jolls
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 13 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
157 Kim, supra note 69, at 137.
154
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former employees have about the protections provided by
158
Kim challenged the assumption that the simple
employment law.
concept of employment at will was easily understood and
159
acknowledged by employees.
Kim found that most employees
believed that the law granted far greater protection from discharge
160
than was actually provided.
For example, although the common law rule clearly permits an
employer to terminate an at-will employee out of personal dislike,
so long as no discriminatory motive is involved, an overwhelming
majority of the respondents—89%—erroneously believe that the
law forbids such a discharge. . . . [T]his study raises serious doubts
about whether workers have the most basic information necessary
161
for understanding the terms on which they have contracted.

Similarly, another study reported that 57.8% of participants
believed that employment at will cannot be legally practiced even if
job applicants sign an employment agreement which expressly states
162
the employment-at-will nature of the relationship.
Another found
that “[o]nly 15 percent of the under 35 age group; 22 percent of the
35–49 age group; eight percent of the 50–65 age group, and 20
percent of the over 65 age group knew that employers hold the right
163
to terminate [employment] at any time even without cause.”
As
one author concludes, “Survey results confirm the presence of a
Pollyannish denial factor in which most respondents believe
164
employees can be legally discharged only for cause.”
These
beliefs persist out of employees’ desire to construct a coherent and
165
secure reality.
Employees’ misconceptions are likely anchored by
a fairness norm that equates unfairness with illegality.
An
employee’s beliefs are shaped by the understanding of employees in
158

Id. at 133–40.
Id.
160 Id. at 140.
161 Id. at 110–11.
162 Robert F. Wayland et al., Employment-at-Will Statements: Perceptions of Job
Applicants, 14 INT’L J. MANPOWER 22, 28 (1993).
163 Frank S. Forbes & Ida M. Jones, A Comparative, Attitudinal, and Analytical Study of
Dismissal of At-Will Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 165 (1986). The study
further noted that ninety-three percent, ninety-one percent, eighty-six percent, and eightyfive percent in the respective age groups found the practice unethical. Id.
164 James Wallihan, The Politics of Employee Discharge: Triggering, Representation,
and Venue, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 625, 630 (2003).
165 Mark V. Roehling & Wendy R. Boswell, “Good Cause Beliefs” in an “At-Will
World”? A Focused Investigation of Psychological Versus Legal Contracts, 16 EMP.
RESPS. & RTS. J. 211, 215 (2004)).
159
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general. For example, the notion that an employer must give a
minimum of two weeks’ notice before discharge is widely held
166
The implication of these results is that discharged
among workers.
employees often believe they are victims of an unfair and illegal act.
Other predispositions that inflate employees’ perceptions of job
167
security and just-cause employment include “optimism bias”
and
168
Optimism bias irrationally discounts
the “availability heuristic.”
the likelihood of something harmful happening to the particular
individual. Employees enter into a job much like people enter into
marriages, optimistic of the long-term nature of the relationship.
Important information such as divorce rates or the high instances of
downsizing or outsourcing is generally discounted. People tend to
believe that divorce or termination of employment is likely to happen
to others but is unlikely to happen to them.
The availability heuristic can affect an employee’s perceptions by
inflating either expectations of job security or job insecurity. If an
employee’s past experiences support the feeling of job security, such
as knowing people who retired after long terms of service with a
single company (especially if the retired individual worked for the
employee’s current employer), then the employee will underestimate
the risk of termination. If the employee has experienced numerous
discharges, possibly working as a temporary worker, then the risk of
being terminated will be arbitrarily inflated.
The optimism bias and the availability heuristic can work together
to inflate employee expectations. A new graduate who possesses a
very positive view of her first employer’s commitment to long-term
relationships and who knows others inside or outside the company
that have experienced long-term employment is likely to have an
irrational set of expectations of employment longevity.
The present survey measured whether providing employees with
information regarding the law of employment, namely the
employment-at-will principle, reduced or increased the rate of
166 Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 63 (2010).
167 See Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics
Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441,
461 (2004) (“Evidence of the overconfidence (or optimism) bias demonstrates that, on
average, decision makers underestimate the likelihood of a bad event happening to
them.”).
168 See id. at 462 (“If a decision maker uses the availability heuristic . . . his estimate of
a risk will depend on the extent to which an example of the risk coming to pass comes
easily to mind.”).
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litigation and retaliation. We hypothesized that the more information
relating to the lack of protections under at-will employment
relationships the employer provided to the employee upon
commencement of employment, the lesser the rate of litigation and
retaliation at discharge. The overall hypothesis that such education
lowers rates of litigation and retaliation was confirmed.
The educating scenario provided the same information as the
cueing scenario but provided additional information stressing the
employment-at-will nature of the employment. In the educating
variation, the company’s lawyer referred the new employee to an
express disclaimer clause on the cover of the employee handbook.
The disclaimer clause explicitly stated that the employer is giving no
assurances as to job security and that the employer: “RETAINS ALL
RIGHTS TO DISCHARGE YOU AT ANY TIME, FOR ANY
169
REASON, AND WITHOUT NOTICE.”
As was expected, the participants that were provided with no
information showed the highest rate of willingness to litigate and
retaliate. Once again, as expected, those who were educated showed
a lesser rate of ligation and retaliation propensities than those who
were provided no information. Therefore, additional information on
employment at will deflated the employee’s presumption or
expectation that the law provides protection against unfair or arbitrary
dismissals. The survey showed that simply cueing reduced the rate of
retaliation only slightly (statistically insignificant), while a fuller
education provided a more dramatic decrease in the rate of retaliation.
A number of conclusions may be derived from these findings.
First, they show that employees are able to process legal information
if properly presented to them. The internalization of the true meaning
of employment at will is not so much the product of an express
disclaimer provision, but the clear explanation of its meaning. While
the cueing scenario provided a brief description of the basic principle
of employment at will and its two exceptions, the educating went into
greater detail as to the fact that the employee’s particular employment
was at will.
It may be true that the content and depth of the information
provided to the employee could trigger different responses at the time
of termination. Behavioral decision theory indicates that individuals
who are provided too much information actually do a poorer job of
processing that information than those who are provided less
169

See infra Appendix A § 3.3.
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170

information.
Bounded rationality recognizes the limits of
171
One scholar notes that, even in
individual cognitive processes.
cases of express disclaimers that the employment is at will,
“employees do not process employers’ words and conduct as the law
172
presumes they do.”
Oftentimes individuals use shortcuts or are
173
biased in some way.
The educating scenario in the current study failed to reach the
limits of bounded rationality. The survey showed that many of the
new employees were able to process a definitive explanation of atwill disclaimers. This diminished the effects caused by lack of
knowledge of the law, optimism bias, and the availability heuristic.
More finely grained surveys will need to be undertaken to measure
how the differences in the information provided—the language used
and how it is presented—will best lower employee perceptions and
expectations of job security. The current study provides a starting
point by proving that additional information regarding employment at
will reduces rates of litigation and retaliation at the time of
termination.
Ultimately, the fairness rationale is a more dominant predictor than
education and cognitive shortcuts like optimism bias, availability
heuristics, and bounded rationality. This is what Christine Jolls has
174
called the “fairness dynamic.”
Behavioral decision theory
recognizes the notion of bounded self-interest in which “people who
are the beneficiaries of fair behavior tend to reciprocate such behavior
175
even when” it is at a cost to themselves.
She notes “the significant
role . . . this aspect of fairness behavior [plays] in the employment
176
relationship.”
Fairness considerations are particularly important in
employment because of its relational aspects. That is why a breach of
the psychological contract can trigger a sense of violation and a
perception of profound unfairness.
In the end, the issues of disclosure, knowledge, and fairness are
interrelated factors. The importance of notice or disclosure to
170 The inability to process information is part of what is referred to as “bounded
rationality.” Jolls et al., supra note 156, at 14–15.
171 Id.
172 Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 7 (2002).
173 See Jolls et al., supra note 156, at 14–15.
174 Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law, and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 47, 48 (2002).
175 Id.
176 Id.
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177

promote the goals of informed consent
and fairness is found
178
The survey showed that some
throughout the legal literature.
advance notice of the “dangers” of employment at will and the use of
procedural and substantive fairness practices mitigate feelings of
injustice at the time of termination resulting in reduced rates of
litigation and retaliation. Although not measured in the present
survey, it can be conjectured that disclosure at the commencement of
employment is positively related to perceptions of fairness at the time
of discharge. This effect was likely captured in the measuring of
procedural fairness and its positive relationship with reduced rates of
litigation and retaliation. In the procedural fairness scenarios, the
employee was referred to the employee manual, which is generally
given at the commencement of employment, to determine whether she
had been treated fairly.
In sum, disclosure, knowledge of the law, the nature of the
relationship, and fairness factors are powerful predictors of employee
reaction at the time of termination. All of those elements are within
the control of the employer. As a best practice, a self-interested
employer should implement practices that increase the level of
information provided to the employee, including disclosures of the
nature of the employment relationship and practices of procedural and
substantive fairness.
B. Employer Perceptions: Internal-External Employment Contracts
Given the longstanding position of the termination-at-will
employment regime, a common perception is that employers operate
under the assumption that they can dismiss employees at any time,
even if oral assurances or a corporate culture of job security exists.
An argument in favor of such an assumption is that employers
consciously frame the external contract as one of at-will employment.
This is evident by the use of disclaimer clauses in employee
handbooks that expressly preserve the at-will nature of the
relationship. At the same time, during the course of employment, the
177 Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 37 (1984) (reporting
a study that found that fairness perceptions were partially determined based on whether the
mediation was undertaken by consent of the parties).
178 See, e.g., Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or at Least Understand Why
You Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491 (2009)
(proposing a method to inform prospective owners of closely held businesses of the
dangers of oppression for minority owners in such businesses).
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employer fosters an employer-employee relationship more compatible
to a just-cause relationship. It is this divergence that is the root of the
problems affecting employment termination. First, the internal
contract or relationship (psychological contract) elevates employees’
expectations of job security and broadens their definition of unfair
dismissal. Second, when confronted with the external or legal
contract, the reality of the internal or psychological relationship
results in irrationally high levels of litigious and retaliatory behavior.
The irrationality of pursuing litigation despite the lack of legal rights
is explained by the elevated expectations stemming from the internal
relationship. Lack of legal rights aside, the employee is likely to feel
a sense of betrayal. This betrayal rests upon the feeling that the
employer intentionally misrepresented the nature of the relationship
and therefore is deserving of punishment.
If the employer’s perception of employment is one of a totally atwill relationship, then why does the employer feel the need to insert
such disclaimers and frame the evidentiary case for at-will
termination? The answer is difficult to provide other than through
circular reasoning. At the high point of the at-will employment law
regime, the courts were monolithic in their application of the at-will
termination rights of the employer. The fact that employment law
evolved out of what was called master-servant law indicates the
dominant position of the employer over the employment relationship.
Employee perceptions of dismissal rights were more likely proemployer. In short-term employment, workers have no illusion of job
security. In long-term employment, the expectations of job security
generally matched the reality of the mid-twentieth-century workplace.
Toward the later part of the last century, with the breakdown of
lifetime employment as the norm, the perception of job security began
to diverge with the reality of the new economy, including volatile
fluctuations in company sizes and increased employee mobility. The
result was a divergence between the employee perception of job
security and the realities of job insecurity. The seminal cases
involving the creation of at-will exceptions were largely due to this
divergence. The foundation of a winning case generally involved
gross instances of procedural and substantive unfairness. Some courts
began to feel that the use of the at-will right of employers was
resulting in injustices that the law could no longer ignore. This was
especially true in the discharge of long-time employees.
As the law moved to prevent injustices in employment discharge,
employers took steps to reinforce the external at-will contract through
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disclaimer clauses and carefully worded employee handbooks and
company policies. It may also be the case that this reinforcement of
the external employment contract is a result of changes in employer
perceptions of the absoluteness of the at-will doctrine. This is
supported by the case law in states that recognize an implied-in-fact
relationship of just-cause employment created subsequent to the
179
commencement of an at-will relationship.
What we are currently
witnessing, with the creation of employment-at-will exceptions, is a
merger of the external legal contract with the internal psychological
contract. Ultimately, the merger of the psychological contract with
employment law is possible through the law’s recognition of a public
policy of “protecting the core bargains struck by employers and
employees against the opportunism that sequential performance
180
risks.”
Under such recognition, the employee would still have to
prove that there was an express or implicit promise of job security or
of an employee-protective process before termination. Proving the
existence of a promise or policy of job security shifts the evidentiary
burden to the employer through a presumption in favor of the
reasonable employee’s expectations of the nature of the employment
relationship.
C. Perceptions, Expectations, and Best Practices
Morrison and Robinson have shown that not all breaches of the
psychological contract produce the same type of employee
181
They distinguish two types of employee perceptions:
response.
182
perceived breach and violation.
This distinction is based on the
view that perceived breach is cognitive in nature and the sense of
183
It is the second type of breach that
violation is emotive in nature.
produces the strongest response—higher rates of litigation and
184
retaliation.
Morrison and Robinson assert that perceived breach is
185
But not all perceived breaches
a precursor to feelings of violation.

179 Professor Estreicher notes, “For employers, there are a sufficient number of
exceptions from the at-will rule . . . that it may be the wisest course to assume that
virtually all employment decisions will be subject to legal scrutiny.” Samuel Estreicher,
Human Behavior and the Economic Paradigm at Work, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
180 Moss, supra note 4, at 343–44.
181 Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 247–48.
182 Id. at 230.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 230–31.
185 Id. at 230.
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produce the affective state that a sense of violation produces.
They
elaborate, “[V]iolation is a combination of disappointment emotions
187
A combination of these emotions leads to a
and anger emotions.”
feeling of betrayal, which in turn results in “a mental state of
188
readiness for action.”
Another explanation of this phenomenon is
the concept of bounded willpower taken from behavioral decision
189
theory.
A breach that rises to the level of a violation may
challenge the dismissed employee’s exercise of self-control relating to
retaliatory responses.
The Morrison and Robinson study provides insight into how
occurrences of perceived violations can be minimized.
It
distinguishes between obligations that the employer is unable to keep
versus those that the employer is unwilling to keep. If the reason for
the breach is the former, then one could expect that the employee’s
reaction would be less emotive. The second type of breach is likely
due to the incongruence between employer and employee
190
expectations.
Incongruence is due to differences in the ability to
process information regarding the employment relationship—
factoring in differences in cognitive and analytical abilities, as well as
the complexity and ambiguity of the obligations. That results in
different interpretations of the psychological contract, which is
significant for a theory of best practices. The employer can reduce
the degree of incongruence and thus diminish the rate of perceptions
of violation by clear and continuous communication with its
employees. Communication or full disclosure of obligations reduces
the occurrences of the emotive state of violation, which reduces rates
of litigation and retaliation. In addition, the law generally recognizes
disclosure as a defense to perceived breaches of contract or claims of
191
misrepresentation.

186

Id.
Id. at 231.
188 Id.
189 Jolls et al., supra note 156, at 15–16.
190 Morrison and Robinson tie the development of incongruence to a number of factors:
(1) “divergent schemata” (the employer and employee may have different cognitive
frameworks for interpreting or processing information), (2) “complexity” (the employee is
provided a large number of stimuli that he or she has difficulty in processing, storing, and
recalling), (3) “ambiguity” (ambiguous stimuli require the employee to construe and to fill
in gaps using contextual factors and prior information). Morrison & Robinson, supra note
57, at 235–36.
191 FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 4.11, at 247. “Courts have departed from or
relaxed the ‘no duty to disclose’ rule by carving out exceptions to the rule and by refusing
187
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In line with Morrison and Robinson, other research has shown that
employer communications regarding employment terms and
conditions can affect perceptions of fairness and trust. This research
hypothesizes that the more explicit the employer is regarding the
terms of the employment, the greater the level of fairness and trust
192
produced.
David Guest and Neil Conway also found that
information communicated at the recruitment, personal, or grassroots
level is more effective than top-down communication in effectuating
193
perceptions of fairness.
If a company fosters a “good company” persona to recruit and to
increase productivity, then the perceptions it fosters lay a basis for
claims of injustice. This produces a somewhat counterintuitive
suggestion that a company’s best practice to preserve an absolute
right to terminate at will is to foster an image of being a “bad
company.” In this way, employees’ perceptions of just-cause
termination rights will be greatly diminished. The problem, of
course, is that the employer loses the benefits of the good company
persona in the areas of recruitment, productivity, and employee
loyalty. The benefit of a good company reputation, especially in a
mobile workforce, is the primary reason for the divergence of the
internal and external employment contracts. Alternatively stated, the
bad company will need to compensate through higher wages and
benefits to attract competent workers. The ability to buy loyalty is
difficult to determine. In the end, the benefits of a good company
persona outweigh the costs of buttressing a strictly at-will perception
of the employment relationship.
This survey supports the notion that the best avenue is for the
employer to be a smart-good employer. A smart-good employer
captures the benefits of the good company persona while putting in
place practices that diminish the perceptions of injustice at the time of
employee termination. Based on the survey findings, best practices
would include (1) educating employees as to the external or legal
contract, (2) implementing practices that buttress its good company
persona while not changing the at-will status of the relationship, and
(3) emphasizing substantive and procedural fairness factors leading
up to and including the time of termination. Educating employees,
to adhere to the rule when it works an injustice.” Id. (citing Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co.,
288 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Wis. 1980)).
192 David E. Guest & Neil Conway, Communicating the Psychological Contract: An
Employer Perspective, 12 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 22, 25–26 (2002).
193 Id. at 35.
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good company practices, and fairness can be seen as part of a
progression, with the fairness norm playing the guiding role. The
fairness norm rationalizes educating as providing fuller disclosure to
the employee. If properly manipulated, these best practices will allow
the employer to frame employee perceptions that the employer’s acts
of fairness are done because it is a good company and not because it
is legally required. As a good company, it provides for the well-being
of the employee, not because it is legally required to treat employees
fairly, but because it cares. The fairness norm undergirds the
practices employed during the employment engagement to emphasize
that an employee’s failure to succeed is due to the employee’s
shortcomings and not due to any malicious motive of the employer.
Finally, the fairness norm is most useful when it guides employer
actions leading up to and including the time of termination. The goal
here is to manage the employee’s perceptions of the fairness of the
discharge by framing the employee’s perceptions throughout the
course of the employment.
The survey supports a theory of best practices that use knowledge,
practices, and perceptions to merge the legal contract with the
psychological contract. It recognizes that the merger in the good
company model will never be complete unless the company adopts a
just-cause-termination employment regime. But it also recognizes
that the costs, in terms of litigation and retaliation attached to the
strong application of the at-will termination rule, can be mitigated
through the use or framing of the internal contract.
Finally, the harm caused by termination, especially those that are
viewed as a breach of the psychological contract, harms not only the
194
discharged employee but also the surviving employees.
The
employer should take steps to minimize the effect of discharge on
195
others in the organization.
Failure to pursue substantive and
procedural fairness or to disclose relevant information during the
process of termination is likely to affect remaining employees and
their view of the psychological contract. There is the fear that an
unfair firing will be internalized by remaining employees as a
violation of their expectations of job security. One possible result is
the diminishment of trust between the remaining employees and the
employer. One study showed that trust can mediate the perceptions of

194 Jean M. Hiltrop, Managing the Changing Psychological Contract, 18 EMP. REL. 36,
44 (1996).
195 Id.
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psychological contract breach and the negative outcomes of perceived
196
Just as the perception of fairness during the course of an
breaches.
employment relationship can reduce negative outcomes, trust building
early in the relationship can minimize negative effects stemming from
subsequent breaches. The feedback loop noted above can weaken the
strength of prior trust.
VI
FUTURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW
The common law is in a constant state of development. The major
force behind its development is the correcting of injustices that occur
within its domain. The common law of contract focuses upon the
intent of a promising party and the expectations of a promisereceiving party. In the classic contract-law paradigm, there are
reciprocal intents, promises, and expectations. Promissory estoppel is
an example in which contract law responds to injustices when the
reciprocal exchange of promises is missing. In some cases, a singular
promise is seen to cause an injustice through the creation of
reasonable or detrimental reliance. In the employment-at-will
scenario, the psychological contract serves to expose the injustice
caused by employer-generated expectations of job security and fair
dismissal. Just as contract law fabricated promissory estoppel to
prevent injustice, in the case of the breach of reasonable expectations
in the employment context, the expectations found in the
psychological contract can be used to fashion an employee remedy.
This Part first reviews the factors that create the psychological
contract: the power of context, the role of education, the role of
fairness, and the role of a priori expectations. It also suggests
avenues for future research in those four areas. Finally, it examines
the evolution of employment-at-will exceptions and the role of the
psychological contract in that evolution, looking to the future of
employment law by using the psychological contract as a means of
reforming employment law. The malleability and flexibility of
contract law provide the means of closing the gap between a legal
employment obligation and a psychological contract obligation. The
rationales for such a change are the broader recognition and
protection of reasonable expectations.
196 See Sandra L. Robinson, Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract, 41
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 574 (1996).
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A. The Power of Context
Greenberg argues that it is important to analyze justice in the
workplace by the application of specific issues to different
197
contexts.
Context in the employment realm can be divided into
internal and external contexts. The internal context is represented by
the firm itself and how it relates to its employees. A corporate culture
and socialization into that culture are examples of phenomena found
in the internal context. The common feature of the elements that
make up the internal context is that they are all within the control of
the employer. If done properly, the internal context can be a tool for
minimizing the degree of incongruence between employer and
employee expectations. Another example of internal context is the
work context itself. For example, prior bad work experiences within
the company may result in organizational cynicism.
This
organizational cynicism becomes part of the internal context of the
psychological contract. One study confirmed the cyclical nature of
198
psychological contract breach and organizational cynicism.
Specifically, employees who believed that the firm’s promises were
199
broken held more cynical attitudes toward their employer.
The external or legal context is generally outside the control of the
employer. However, the employer can influence how the employee
interfaces with or perceives the external contract. Employers face
three challenging conditions concerning their ability to control the
appearance of fairness in the termination of employees. First, due to
economic and financial conditions, employers may be limited in their
ability to create a stable and secure employment environment.
Second, employees’ beliefs that the law protects them from unfair or
arbitrary discharge are likely to persist at some level. Third,
employees now have a larger menu of legal remedies with which to
punish employers for unfair decisions than they had in the past. The
result is a situation where employers perceive themselves to be under
constant threat of litigation or retaliation from discharged
200
employees.
More research needs to be done to determine the ways
197 GREENBERG, supra note 116, at 401. Morrison and Robinson also note that there is
“considerable variance across occupations, organizations, industries, and countries with
respect to the number and types of obligations that exist between employees and
organizations.” Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 249.
198 Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, supra note 42, at 641–42.
199 Id.
200 Cf. Rita Murphy, OSHA, AIR21 and Whistleblower Protection for Aviation Workers,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 901, 914–15 (2004) (discussing whistleblower protection and noting
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an employer can frame the internal context of a relationship to combat
the larger societal and legal context that encourages employee
201
litigation and retaliation.
A number of studies have noted the “changed world” of
employment. Morrison and Robinson note that “assurance of job
security and steady rewards in return for hard work and loyalty no
202
longer exist in most cases.”
Although such assurances may not be
as forthcoming from employers, employees’ expectations of job
security are more likely to resist such a radical shift in the
employment relationship. Optimism bias supports the employees’
positive opinion of their employment relationship and their ability to
obtain job security. More study is needed to measure the persistence
of employee expectations despite a change in context at the macro
level.
Previously, it was noted that the psychological contract is a bundle
of many matched and unmatched expectations. Due to that
complexity and the uncertainty of the market for job security, the
divergence of employer and employee expectations is likely to widen
203
in the short term.
The increase in the incongruence of expectations
necessarily increases the rate at which employees perceive employers’
204
violations of the psychological contract.
However, a feedback loop
may eventually lower employees’ expectations that make up the
psychological contract.
It would seem that if an employer
consistently violates the psychological contract, this pattern of
violations should feed back to its employees. The feedback should
reduce employees’ expectations and thereby diminish the scope and
strength of the psychological contract.

that because of its protections and low burdens of proof, “disgruntled or troublemaking
employees may find it easier to file frivolous complaints and engage in needless litigation
with hopes of increasing costs for employers and getting revenge”).
201 Rousseau notes, “Firms foster different psychological contracts by the way they
reward their employees and the HRM strategies that underly [sic] personnel practices.”
Denise M. Rousseau, New Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their Employer’s
Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts, 11 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 389,
399 (1990).
202 Morrison & Robinson, supra note 57, at 226.
203 One study showed “that among a sample of recent MBA graduates, 55% believed
that some aspect of their psychological contracts had been broken by their employers
during the previous two years.” Id. (citing Robinson & Rousseau, supra note 67).
204 See Robinson & Rousseau, supra note 67.
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B. The Role of Education
Our survey showed that providing employees with information
about the nature of employment law and their particular relationship
relates to their perceptions of fairness. As noted earlier, more finely
grained research should further explore the relationship between
employee knowledge of employment at will and the persistent beliefs
in the existence of rights that protect against other than just-cause
termination. Would a more in-depth explanation of employee rights
than presented in this survey produce better results in further reducing
the rates of litigation and retaliation? Would other practices in
framing those rights, such as annual re-education, produce better
results? Would too much information overwhelm employees’
cognitive abilities, leading them back to the use of heuristics
(availability, fairness) and biases (optimism)?
C. The Role of Fairness
The fairness norm is the most robust predictor of an employee’s
205
reaction at the time of termination.
If there is a perception of
unfairness, there is more likely a perception that the termination was
unjust. A feeling of injustice is the strongest rationale for an
employee’s perception of a violation as opposed to a merely cognitive
recognition of breach. The sense of violation produces the emotive
response most likely to result in litigation and retaliation by the
employee. More research is needed to see how the fairness norm can
be used to lower employee feelings of violation and help merge the
legal and psychological contracts. In the area of the impact of
procedural and substantive fairness, the avenues for future research
are many. A number of them became apparent in undertaking the
current survey. Because the current study focused on substantiveprocedural fairness at the time of termination, an extended look at
procedural and substantive fairness at the time of hire and throughout
the employment relationship should be undertaken to see how that
history frames the perceptions of fairness at discharge. If the
205 The perception of fairness or unfairness has been acknowledged as a prime
motivator of human behavior. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 59 (1989) (“Litigants were more satisfied with the
outcome . . . and perceived the procedures to be fairer when the outcome exceeded their
expectations . . . .”); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ.
L. REV. 753, 753–54 (2004) (asserting the fairness perceptions are the key factors to
understanding negotiating behaviors).
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employee views her employer as generally unfair, does that provide a
framing bias or availability heuristic that is likely to result in a
negative response even in instances where the discharge is both
procedurally and substantively fair? Are there ways for the employer
to reframe or overcome such biases prior to discharge?
Another study could try to measure the long-term effects on
perceptions of a variety of procedural and substantive fairness
practices. In the procedural or process realm, the role of performance
reviews, the frequency of reviews, and whether the employee
perceives the evaluations as merit based or based upon inappropriate
factors must be researched. Additionally, a survey should test how
employees’ perceptions of the goodness or badness of their
relationships with the reviewers or evaluators impact employees’
intentions to litigate or retaliate at the time of discharge. Other
factors that should be measured include the role of mentoring, the role
of providing ample notice regarding changes in the terms and
conditions of employment, the perceptions of equality or inequality in
206
the application of company policies, and whether these perceptions
substantially influence the employee’s reactions at the time of
termination.
D. The Role of A Priori Expectations
The current study also did not make any distinctions between the
impact of long-term employment and the development of firmspecific skill sets, and shorter lengths of employment and the
207
development of marketable skills sets.
It has generally been
conjectured that such factors go to the core of employee expectations
and influence an employee’s feelings of injustice at the time of
termination. From the perspective of law, this leads to a host of
206 In an examination of the effect of corporate mission statements on organizational
decision making, one study asked in relationship to employees, “Do firms practice what
they preach in their mission?” The answer was “no.” Barbara R. Bartkus & Myron
Glassman, Do Firms Practice What They Preach?: The Relationship Between Mission
Statements and Stakeholder Management, in LEADING ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES
FOR A NEW ERA 297, 305 (Gill Robinson Hickman ed., 2d ed. 2010). The authors did
indicate that despite the failure to practice what they preach, the incorporation of the
employee as a stakeholder in the mission statement serves a symbolic purpose:
“[E]veryone feels a little better when included in the mission statement, even with full
knowledge that their inclusion does not really make a difference.” Id.
207 Sherry E. Sullivan & Lisa Mainiero, Women’s Kaleidoscope Careers: A New
Framework for Examining Women’s Stress Across the Lifespan, in EXPLORING THE WORK
AND NON-WORK INTERFACE 205, 214 (Pamela L. Perrewé & Daniel C. Ganster eds.,
2007).
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questions. The length of employment and acquisition of firm-specific
skills creates the problem of employee vulnerability and economic
dependence.
Should the law provide added protections for
employees, or should the employer owe a heightened duty to longterm employees? If long-term employees are less marketable, does
the employer have a duty to provide retraining opportunities? It is
unlikely that the law will recognize such a duty anytime soon.
However, the answer is clearer if approached from the perspective of
ethics or morality. Psychologist Carol Gilligan’s study of female
moral development led to a school of ethics called the “ethics of
208
care.”
Under such an approach, an employer does owe a greater
duty of care toward long-term employees.
Implied in such
relationships are the norms of loyalty and trust as well as factors of
dependence and mobility.
Gilligan labels these “concrete
209
relationships.”
A more in-depth study should measure the impacts along a
continuum of mostly a priori employee expectations on rates of
litigation and retaliation. An employee with expectations of shortterm employment that are based upon the employee’s belief that the
job will be a stepping stone to a better job at another company may
still have feelings of injustice at termination. What effect does the
timing of the termination (prior to skill acquisition, during skill
acquisition, or after skill acquisition) have on such an employee at the
time of termination? What is the effect of the employee’s feelings
that the company’s skill training is of lesser quality than expected?
What is the effect of the failure of the employee’s expected career
path, such as having to stay with the company for a longer than
expected period, on the employee’s feelings at termination?
208

E.g., Tally Kritzman-Amir, Looking Behind the “Protection Gap”: The Moral
Obligation of the State to Necessitous Immigrants, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 80
(2009) (“The ethics of care approach is based on psychological research performed by
Carol Gilligan, who analyzed the problem-solving attitudes of women and men in the
hopes of determining whether women have a different “voice”—or approach—than men.
Gilligan concluded that females apply an ethics of care approach and perceive ethical
dilemmas in terms of relationships, responsibility, caring, context, and communication.”);
Karin van Marle, “Meeting the World Halfway”—The Limits of Legal Transformation, 16
FLA. J. INT’L L. 651, 662 (2004). See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
209 Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 624 (1990).
The author explains that one “feminist strategy is to claim that women's distinctive
attributes promote a distinctive form of understanding. . . . This line of analysis,
popularized by Carol Gilligan, argues that women tend to reason in ‘a different voice’;
they are less likely than men to privilege abstract rights over concrete relationships and are
more attentive to values of care, connection, and context.” Id.
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E. Employment Law: Past and Future
This Subpart looks to the past and future of employment law. It
suggests that the psychological contract played a role in the
development of exceptions to the termination-at-will principle. It
then recommends that the psychological contract be used as a basis to
reform employment law in the future. The merging of the legal and
psychological employment contracts advances contract law’s goal of
preventing or remedying contractual injustices. Employment law
reform may take the form of a broad recognition of a just-cause
termination rule. It is more likely to come through the application of
existing contract law structures, such as the more expansive use of
promissory estoppel and contextual interpretation.
1. Evolution of At-Will Exceptions and the Psychological Contract
Despite the lowering of expectations due to the new employment
marketplace—one characterized by instability and employee
mobility—psychological contract theory is useful in assessing the
beliefs and practices of employers, employees, and the legal system.
It can be conjectured that the implied-in-fact and good-faith
exceptions were developed in response to breaches of the
psychological contract. Fairness and reasonable expectations have a
long tradition in contract law and at times act as counterweights to
210
freedom of contract.
Contract law adjusts to novel developments
in business transactions and to changes in societal norms. As the
model of lifetime employment began to disintegrate, companies
provided assurances through employee handbooks, benefit packages,
and oral promises of job security. The clash between employee
expectations and the reality of the employment relationship resulted
in increased feelings of unfairness and injustice at the time of
termination. The courts began to respond to perceived unfairness and
injustice by crafting exceptions to the termination-at-will doctrine.
General rules or standards of law generally begin as absolutes.
Eventually, a category of cases questions the justice of the rule when
it is applied to specific fact patterns. Judges move to prevent
systemic injustices by fabricating exceptions to the general rule. In

210

See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS
(2001) (reviewing the equitable reformation of contracts in the twentieth
century and the immutability of equitable contract principles); DiMatteo, supra note 126,
at 444–45 (noting the detachment of underlying norms and contract rules and that the
fairness norm plays a fundamental role in judicial decision making).
AND PRINCIPLES
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utilitarian terms, the benefits of a general rule applied to a general
area of law or society may be justified. Over time, however, it
becomes clear that there are groups of similarly situated cases or fact
patterns where the general rule produces unjust results. Rule
utilitarianism justifies adopting an exception to the rule that yields
greater benefits than merely applying the general rule across all cases.
The key element in the rule-utilitarian approach is the importance of a
category or group. The law should respond only when there is a welldefined and sizeable group that justifies an exception or a rule
adjustment. If this is not done properly, then the benefits of certainty
and predictability provided by general rules will be lost.
Standards such as unconscionability and good faith are different
than rules. They serve as metaprinciples that cover potentially all
contractual relationships. Their application is done on an ad hoc basis
because each case is different in some way. Even though a workable
definition of good faith may be out of reach, Professor Summers’s
211
excluder analysis can assist in determining types of bad faith.
The
court in Busam Motor Sales v. Ford Motor Co. described the essence
of an excluder analysis: “It is possible that it would have shown
certain acts or course of conduct . . . from which the required bad
212
faith could be properly inferred.”
If such patterns of conduct
reoccur in a significant number of cases, then those patterns lay the
foundation for the recognition and application of the duty of good
faith.
There is a strong argument that, in a covert way, psychological
contract theory, or at least the contextual elements that are recognized
in the theory, lies at the base of the good-faith and implied-in-fact
exceptions that developed in the law. The consistent breach of
employee expectations (psychological contract) allowed courts to
witness the injustice caused by the shield of the employment-at-will
doctrine. It is unlikely that the courts were familiar with the human
resource management literature, and it is equally unlikely that the
good-faith or implied-in-fact exceptions were the impetus for
psychological contract theory. But both the development of the
exceptions and of psychological contract theory respond to the same
sense of injustice caused by the intentional breach of employee
expectations whether the breach is recognized as a legal breach or

211

Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 28, at 818–24.
203 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1953) (dealing with a termination of an automobile
franchise).
212
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213

not.
The exceptions close the gap between the psychological
contract and the legal contract.
2. The Future of Employment Law: Using the Psychological Contract
to Reform Employment Law
The harm caused by violations of the psychological contract has
only partially been recognized in contract and employment law. This
harm is never more present than at the time of termination.
Termination is the most important condition or term of employment
because it is one in which the employee can no longer adjust
expectations and actions to preserve the relationship. The analysis in
this Article suggests that the employment law of the future should
take fuller cognizance of the psychological contract. In sum, both
contract law and the psychological contract are expectations based.
Contract law serves to protect the expectancy interests of the
contracting parties. The psychological contract focuses on the unmet
expectations of the employee and the harm caused to them by
violations of the psychological contract. The problem is that such
contracts do not fit into the framework of classical contract law,
which requires clearness of intent, preference for written agreements,
and a matching of bilateral expectations. However, a fuller
incorporation of relational contract norms in employment termination
law would narrow the divergence between enforceable employment
contracts and unenforceable psychological contracts.
The move to merge the two types of employment contracts is not
based purely on the employee’s perspective and feelings of
214
injustice.
It is also based on the employer’s role in creating and
manipulating employee perceptions and expectations relating to the
job and the intentions of the employer. In essence, the employer is
procuring additional benefits (loyalty and productivity) without
incurring additional costs or providing additional remuneration. As
the present study shows, unilateral actions taken by the employer
(procedural fairness, substantive fairness, and education) influence
213 Professor Estlund notes that because of the gap between the psychological contract
and a legal contract the employer has it both ways in that it “enjoy[s] the benefits of
employee expectations of legally enforceable job security without legal accountability.”
Estlund, supra note 172, at 7.
214 Professor Estlund suggests closing the gap between psychological contracts and
legal employment contracts by adopting a waivable default in favor of job security. Id. at
8. This forces the employer to obtain a waiver of job security from her employees. Id.
This way, the employer cannot obtain the benefits of employee expectations of job
security and the legal reality of employment at will. Id.
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the reaction of the employee at the time of termination. If done
properly, such actions prevent the elevation of a perceived
psychological breach to the level of a violation, which in turn explains
the reduced rates of litigation and retaliation. The study, like all
empirical studies, is purely descriptive in nature. It shows that the
employer may take actions that reduce employee and employer harm.
The law uses descriptive understandings to convert a “may” into a
“should” or a “must.” The “should” response uses the breach of the
psychological contract as one factor in determining employer liability.
The “must” response results in the breach of the psychological
contract being recognized as a breach of a legal contract. The “must”
version is best left to legislative regulation of the workplace. Federal
and state regulations pervade most employment relationships from
workplace safety to minimum wage to plant-closing and maternityleave laws. Legislative mandates attempt to provide bright-line rules
or absolute requirements. However, courts can more adeptly adopt
the “should” version. Given the complexity of the psychological
contract, recognition of a breach of the psychological contract can be
utilized as a factor by the courts in determining employer liability.
A strong reason for reforming employment law to better reflect an
employee’s sense of injustice at termination is that the employee’s
sense of injustice is within the employer’s ability to control. Through
practices of strict adherence to procedural fairness, including proper
disclosures and education, the employer can minimize the sense of
violation and reduce rates of employee-generated litigation. The law
can be reformed to recognize these contextual factors and thereby
reduce the cognitive dissonance of the employee confronting both
legal and psychological contracts. The issue of substantive fairness is
more problematic. Requiring substantive fairness is likely to require
a transformation of employment law from at will to just cause. Short
of such a radical change, the courts could perform a contextual
analysis to determine whether the requirement of substantive fairness
was self-imposed by the employer. Self-imposition of a just-cause
requirement can be determined by the employer’s role in building the
expectations of employees relating to job security and just-cause
215
termination.
215 The practice of procedural fairness is likely to support the employee’s expectations
of just-cause termination. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66–70, 205 (1988) (describing field studies that
show that greater perceptions of procedural justice generally produce greater perceptions
of distributive justice, regardless of whether an outcome is positive or negative).
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The above discussion provides the rationales for the partial
merging of the legal employment contract with the psychological
contract. This merging can be performed within the framework of
existing law. The sections below provide ways in which current law
can be changed to more fully recognize the psychological contract.
a. Employment-At-Will Exceptions
First, the implied-in-fact exception to employment at will should
be universally recognized. Elements of the psychological contract
should be utilized in determining if an implied-in-fact contract has
216
Psychological contracts focus on expectations of the
been formed.
employee based upon the employer’s assurances and practices.
Research in psychological contracts can help understand which
explicit and implicit statements create the expectation in the
employee’s mind that an employment contract superseding
employment at will had been formed.
Not every employee
expectation should establish a contractual obligation because not
217
every employee expectation is reasonable.
However, inquiry into
the psychological contract can help illuminate otherwise opaque
implied promises.
Second, the same rationale for making the implied-in-fact
exception more universal supports the claim for expanding the goodfaith exception. Implied-in-fact contracts capture the moment that
reasonable employee expectations were created by the employer. The
malicious creation of such expectations with the intent to procure
employee-generated benefits can be captured by application of the
good-faith exception. Because the employer is the primary generator
of such expectations, especially concerning job security, then it
should be required to meet a threshold of substantive and procedural
good faith when terminating employees. Psychological contract
theory can illuminate employee expectations; it can also help
understand attitudes. To understand good faith, one must look to,
among other sources, the attitudes and communications of the parties
218
in their interactions with one another.
Psychological contract
216 See DiMatteo, supra note 134, at 782 (“It can be argued that the psychological
contract is akin to the implied-in-fact or good faith duty exceptions to the employer’s right
to discharge an employee without cause.”); Stone, supra note 56, at 551–52 & n.110.
217 See Bird, supra note 38, at 208–15.
218 See, e.g., Burton Kainen & Shel D. Myers, Turning Off the Power on Employees:
Using Employees’ Surreptitious Tape-Recordings and E-Mail Intrusions in Pursuit of
Employer Rights, 27 STETSON L. REV. 91, 110 (1997) (“Good faith and fair dealing mean
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theory can be used to trace employees’ expectations to employeremployee or manager-employee interactions to support or refute a
claim of bad faith.
b. Promissory Estoppel
The expansion or more liberal use of promissory estoppel in the
219
area of employment discharge makes conceptual sense.
Promissory estoppel primarily focuses upon the reasonable
expectations of the promisee. The psychological contract literature
demonstrates that the employee’s expectations of job security and
employer good faith are substantially related to employer
representations or to other phenomena within the control of the
employer, such as organizational culture. If employee reliance on
employer-generated expectations is reasonable, then a claim of
promissory estoppel should be allowed to prevent an injustice to the
220
discharged employee.
All the requirements of a promissory estoppel claim—promise
(express or implied), reasonable reliance, and injustice—are present
in the breach of many psychological contracts at the time of
termination. It is important to note that the burden of proof remains
with the employee. However, a broader recognition by the courts of
the psychological contract will lessen the evidentiary burden. The
integrity of applying promissory estoppel to the employment
discharge setting is that it does not require a finding of a contract or a
bilateral exchange of promises. It is a justice-based claim found
within contract law that requires only the giving of promises or
assurances by one party—the employer. If the employer is the cause
of the employee’s expectations, then it should be held accountable if a
breach of those expectations works an injustice. In the end, it is not
whether promissory estoppel is applicable to employment discharge;
it is whether the courts will be willing to recognize the harm caused
by violations of the psychological contract. Such recognition
an attitude or ‘state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to
defraud, and, generally speaking, being faithful to one's duty or obligation.’”).
219 See Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1999).
220 Professor Hillman notes “that the theory [of promissory estoppel] should be
especially significant in the non-union employment setting, where, through their
communications, employers seek to create the expectation of a stable, secure work
environment and where, because of their general lack of contractual job security and their
material and psychological investments in their jobs, employees are prone to rely on these
messages.” Id. at 2.
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provides the evidentiary foothold needed to make a successful
promissory estoppel claim.
c. Tort of Bad Faith and the Good-Faith Exception
Another potential legal response is found in the tort of bad faith.
The tort of bad-faith breach was recognized by the California
Supreme Court in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard
221
Even though the courts have generally not
Oil Co. of California.
elected to expand the tort of bad faith outside the realm of insurance
222
law, there is no reason why the tort theoretically cannot be applied
to any type of contract. Nonetheless, it has been used primarily
against insurance companies who fail to pay out legitimate claims in a
223
timely fashion.
The concept of bad-faith breach as enunciated in
Seaman’s could be applied to bad-faith termination in the
employment setting. The Seaman’s court based the claim of bad faith
224
on the “special relationship” between the insured and the insurer.
The employment relationship should be designated as such a special
relationship. The Seaman’s court described the special relationship of
insured-insurer as “characterized by elements of public interest,
225
adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.”
A strong case can be made
that the employer owes at least a quasi-fiduciary duty to its employees
to act in good faith. The good-faith exception to employment at will
is fashioned out of the same public policy rationales.
Just as the tort of bad faith is based on a breach of an implied duty
in an insurance contract, a tort of bad-faith termination can be
fabricated based upon an implied duty in the employment context.
An implied duty requiring good-faith termination would allow a claim
for bad-faith termination despite the absence of an express

221 686 P.2d 1158, 1170 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil
Co., 900 P.2d 669, 670 (Cal. 1995).
222 The California Supreme Court subsequently rejected the application of the tort of
bad faith to the employment relationship. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (failing to apply the tort of bad faith to the employee discharge
scenario); see also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 444 (Del.
1996) (confining the tort of bad faith to insurance cases).
223 See Arnold R. Levinson & Terrence J. Coleman, Insurance Bad Faith Claims Are
Not Preempted, TRIAL, June 2001, at 30, 31 (noting that “many states’ bad faith laws are
limited exclusively to insurance claims.”). See generally 16 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:104 (4th ed.
2000).
224 Seaman’s Direct Buying Service Inc., 686 P.2d at 1666–67.
225 Id. at 1666.
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226

employment contract.
Instead of requiring a bad-faith breach of a
legal contract, evidence of breach of the psychological contract can be
used to prove the bad-faith nature of the termination.
3. Summary
Because employment law is contractually based, the general
recognition of the good-faith exception would be the more
conceptually sound manner in which to respond to serious violations
227
of the psychological contract.
We believe that the current study
supports the more expansive use of the good-faith exception as well
as the expansion of the tort of bad faith into the employment setting.
The study showed that it is in the employer’s control to manage the
employee’s perception of the termination as one of good faith or bad
faith.
Given the bold claims of the preceding paragraph, it is important to
note that we are not suggesting that any breach of the psychological
contract at the time of termination equates to wrongful discharge.
This is because not all psychological contract breaches are the same.
This was alluded to in the literature distinguishing between perceived
breaches that do, and perceived breaches that do not, rise to the level
228
of a violation. Thus, like contract interpretation, whether a breach
of the psychological contract reaches the level of a breach of a legal
contract depends on a broad range of contextual factors including
company representations, policies, and practices; organizational
229
culture;
reasonableness of employee expectations; longevity of
230
teaching of firm-specific versus marketable skills;
employment;
226 Another analogy is the claim of tortious interference with business relations, which
is not based upon an actual contract breach.
227 It has been argued that “relational opportunism” used by employers should be held
in check through the law’s recognition of an “implied covenant of the employment
relation.” Bird, supra note 38, at 195–215.
228 Classical contract law was more formal in the interpretation of contracts limiting
admissible evidence to the written contract or direct, express communications between the
parties. Neoclassical contract law embraces the concept that the meaning of a contract
cannot be fully known without considering the context in which it was formed. Relational
contract law broadens the contextual factors that should be considered in interpreting and
enforcing contracts.
229 “Corporate culture has been defined as an internal consistency within an
organization that influences the behavior and values of its employees.” Bird, supra note
38, at 180.
230 See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH L. REV. 8 (1993). Furthermore, “employers, particularly
leaders of a company, have a profound impact upon the development, nature, and
characteristics of employees’ cultural norms.” Bird, supra note 38, at 183.
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and so on. If the implied-in-fact or good-faith exceptions were fully
recognized, then the same contextual factors that are prominent in
psychological contract theory could be used to prove claims for
breach of an implied contract or the duty of good faith.
CONCLUSION
The employment-at-will doctrine allows broad discretion to
employers to hire and fire for virtually any reason. The doctrine
enables both the employer and employee to terminate the employment
relationship with minimal time and cost. Viewed literally, it
presupposes a regime where employers and employees bargain for
their wage-labor agreement in good faith and with equal bargaining
power. Based on this model of employment, separation from
employment should be an emotionally neutral event. Yet, neither
employer nor employee treats the employment relationship as simply
a bargained-for, wage-labor agreement.
Studies reveal that most employees do not understand the actual
discretion that employment at will grants employers. Instead,
employees perceive the employment relationship as based upon
fundamental fairness principles. The employee’s sense of fairness
imbues their perception of the employment relationship regardless of
what the law dictates or the protections actually available.
The employee’s sense of being treated unfairly—largely due to
perceived breaches of non-legally recognized expectations—has been
the subject of significant study in the area of psychological contract
theory found in human resource research literature. When an
employee is discharged, she does not simply refer to the applicable
law for guidance, but rather perceives the employment separation
through the lens of fairness or justice. A feeling of being treated
unjustly generates a significant negative emotional reaction. If the
employee views the employment termination as a violation of
employer-generated expectations, then the likelihood of employee
retaliation increases. This reaction is not something that an employer,
from the perspective of self-interest, should ignore. Employee
retaliation can take the form of theft or sabotage, creation of negative
reputational effects for the employer, or increased rates of litigation.
Bad-faith termination also produces a feedback loop that may affect
the remaining employees’ view of the company. Some measure of
equitable treatment by the employer in the discharge of employees is
not only ethically correct, but is cost-effective from the perspective of
the employer.
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This Article presented the findings of an empirical survey of 763
participants. Through the use of twelve discharge scenarios, the study
tested the role of procedural and substantive fairness factors in
predicting negative employee reactions. As expected, scenarios
involving procedural or substantive unfairness were positively
correlated with increased propensities to retaliate and litigate. In
scenarios involving both procedural and substantive unfairness, the
effect on the propensity to retaliate or to litigate was amplified. The
reverse was also true; scenarios involving both procedural and
substantive fairness reduced rates of retaliation and litigation to nearly
half of those where both procedural and substantive unfairness factors
were used. The study also measured the effects of educating
employees about the employment-at-will rule on employees’ feelings
of injustice or violation at the time of termination. The study found
that educating employees at the time of hire reduced the rates of
retaliation and litigation intentions at the time of discharge.
The study’s findings highlighted the high degree of employee
sensitivity to perceived unfairness or injustice at the time of
discharge. The reason for being terminated, as well as the process by
which an employee is discharged, influence the employee’s reactions
to being discharged. Termination for a fair reason is helpful, as is
implementing a fair process for termination. When both are present,
the rates of retaliation and litigation are substantially reduced. In
addition, educating employees in the law of termination diminished
the rates of retaliation and litigation at the time of termination. It can
be conjectured that early disclosure of the lack of employee
protections dampens the feeling of injustice or violation at the time of
discharge, thus reducing rates of retaliation and litigation.
Psychological contract theory can be used to explain the creation of
the existing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Psychological contract theory also can be used as a guide to
reforming employment law. This reformation can be done by a
wholesale change from the employment-at-will to a just-causetermination legal regime. This, however, is unlikely to happen, and
the use of existing doctrines, such as promissory estoppel and the tort
of bad faith, as well as an expansion of the implied-in-fact and dutyof-good-faith exceptions to employment at will may achieve the same
goal. Such reform is not solely for the benefit of employees. Our
empirical findings and analysis suggest that such reform will result in
the merging of the legal employment contract and the psychological
contract, which will produce benefits for employers and employees.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLES USED IN TWELVE EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS
Upon graduating from business school, you accept an offer of
employment from APEX Corporation. After accepting APEX’s job
offer you attended a mandatory orientation for new employees.
1. PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS: FAIR AND UNFAIR
1.1 Procedural Fairness
Upon receiving the news of your firing, you consulted your
Employee Manual, which described the procedures governing
terminations. The section on “Employee Discharge” noted that each
employee should be evaluated every six months and should be
notified of areas that required improvement. Before an employee can
be fired, the Manual requires two notices of substandard work and a
final three-month probationary period. If, after the probationary
period, the employee had not improved satisfactorily, then the
employee is issued a two-week notice of discharge.
True to the process outlined in the Manual, you received your first
review at the six-month mark. That review did indeed include a
“Notice of Substandard Evaluation.” The evaluation stated the
specific reason for the notice and suggested that you seek guidance
through the human resource department or the organization’s informal
mentoring program. You decided to attempt to make the necessary
changes to improve, but it was more difficult than you had foreseen.
Thus, your second six-month review again included a “Notice of
Substandard Evaluation” along with a notice that you would be given
a three-month probationary period to improve.
The review
acknowledged some areas of improvement, but the improvement was
not sufficient. The review also assigned a more senior member of the
company to act as a mentor from whom you could seek help. Despite
some helpful suggestions and continued effort on your part, little
changed in the coming months. As a result, the three-month period
was followed by a “Two Week Notice of Discharge.” Thus, the
procedures laid out in the Employee Manual had been followed
completely.
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1.2 Procedural Unfairness
Upon receiving the news of your firing, you consulted your
Employee Manual, which described the procedures governing
terminations. The section on “Employee Discharge” noted that each
employee should be evaluated every six months and should be
notified of areas that required improvement. Before an employee can
be fired, the Manual requires two notices of substandard work and a
final three-month probationary period. If, after the probationary
period, the employee had not improved satisfactorily, then the
employee is issued a two-week notice of discharge.
Your first six-month evaluation by your new boss was uneventful,
with your performance being satisfactory in almost all respects. To
your surprise, you suddenly received a “Notice of Substandard
Evaluation” only three weeks later. This was followed almost
immediately by a “Two Week Notice of Discharge.” Thus, the
procedures laid out in the Employee Manual had not been followed at
all. You immediately complained to the Personnel Director, who
stated that there had been a change in company policy giving
department heads greater discretion in employee discharges. The
director said there was nothing that could be done about your
termination.
2. SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS: FAIR (PERFORMANCE) AND UNFAIR
(OBESITY)
2.1 Substantive Fairness
It has now been more than a year since you accepted APEX’s job
offer and attended the new employee orientation. The manager who
hired you was hired by another company soon after your arrival, and
you have worked under a new manager for a full year.
Unfortunately, you have been advised that your job performance is
substandard. You find the work especially difficult and fall behind
the performance numbers of most of your coworkers. You have
failed to improve your overall performance, though you did get better
in one or two specific areas. Despite these efforts, you are fired due
to poor job performance.
2.2 Substantive Unfairness
It has now been more than a year since you accepted APEX’s job
offer and attended the new employee orientation. Another company
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hired the manager who hired you soon after your arrival, and you
have worked under a new manager for a full year.
Unfortunately, your new boss complains to you and others in the
department about the fact that you are overweight. Your boss
suggests that your overweight appearance is not the image that the
department should project. You failed to lose weight in the months
following these comments, though you did attempt to improve your
professional appearance by altering your clothes and other aspects of
your appearance. Despite these efforts, you are fired due to being
overweight.
3. LAW CONDITIONS: NON-CUEING, CUEING, AND EDUCATING
3.1 No Law Cueing
The new employee orientation was fairly typical for corporations
of APEX’s size and industry. Historical information was provided
about the company, and economic information on the company’s
performance was reviewed. This information included market-share
information, positioning of relevant products vis-à-vis competitors,
and profitability information for the last several quarters. Various
procedures governing compensation, benefits, and discharge policies
were also discussed, and new employees were given a chance to ask
questions about such policies.
3.2 Cueing
One important aspect of the orientation was a presentation made by
the company lawyer that discussed the nature of your employment.
The lawyer noted that the employment relationship is primarily based
upon the law of contract, where the employer and employee agree to
the terms of the employment. An express employment contract is one
that is in a written form, but most jobs do not actually have an express
contract. Instead, the law generally presumes that an employment
relationship is at will. This means that the employee may quit at any
time without notice and the employer may fire the employee at any
time and without cause (reason).
Some states, however, have begun to develop two exceptions to the
employer’s rights to freely fire an at-will employee. Both of these
relate to the notion of implied contracts. First, even when there is no
express contract providing job security, statements made by the
company orally or in its documents (policies, procedures, and
employee handbooks) create a modification of the at-will nature of
the employment.
This is called an implied-in-fact contract.
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Therefore, firing an employee in violation of such oral or written
statements may lead to a charge of “breach of contract.” Second,
courts may imply a duty on the employer to “act in good faith” in the
discharge of an employee. Therefore, giving an insincere reason for
firing any employee may lead to a claim of “wrongful discharge.”
3.3 Educating
One important aspect of the orientation was a presentation made by
the company lawyer that discussed the nature of your employment.
The lawyer noted that the employment relationship is primarily based
upon the law of contract, where the employer and employee agree to
the terms of the employment. An express employment contract is one
that is in a written form, but most jobs do not actually have an express
contract. Instead, the law generally presumes that an employment
relationship is at will. This means that the employee may quit at any
time without notice and the employer may fire the employee at any
time and without cause (reason).
Some states, however, have begun to develop two exceptions to the
employer’s rights to freely fire an at-will employee. Both of these
relate to the notion of implied contracts. First, even when there is no
express contract providing job security, statements made by the
company orally or in its documents (policies, procedures, employee
handbooks) create a modification of the at-will nature of the
employment. This is called an implied-in-fact contract. Therefore,
firing an employee in violation of such oral or written statements may
lead to a charge of “breach of contract.” Second, the courts may
imply a duty on the employer to “act in good faith” in the discharge of
an employee. Therefore, giving an insincere reason for firing any
employee may lead to a charge of “wrongful discharge.”
The company lawyer went on to say that express provisions in the
Employee Manual can maintain the legal enforceability of at-will
relationships despite any assurances of long-term employment. These
“express disclaimer clauses” will win out over any policy statements
in the Employee Manual or statements made by company
representatives regarding long-term job security. The lawyer noted
that the extended process of evaluation and notice in the Employee
Manual was simply a statement of “current” company policy that was
subject to change at any time. Therefore, either you or the company
may end the employment relationship at any time without cause and
“for any or no reason.” The lawyer then referred you to the
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“disclaimer clause” that appeared on the front cover of the Employee
Manual in bold letters. It states that: THIS MANUAL AND THE
POLICIES CONTAINED WITHIN ARE GIVEN TO YOU FOR
INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. NOTHING CONTAINED
WITHIN THIS MANUAL IS TO BE CONSIDERED BINDING ON
THE EMPLOYER. THIS MANUAL DOES NOT REPRESENT A
CONTRACT AND IS NOT MEANT TO IMPOSE ANY LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS UPON THE EMPLOYER REGARDING JOB
SECURITY OR THE PROCESS OF DISCHARGING
EMPLOYEES. THE EMPLOYER RETAINS ALL RIGHTS TO
DISCHARGE YOU AT ANY TIME, FOR ANY REASON, AND
WITHOUT NOTICE. THE EMPLOYER MAY AMEND OR
TERMINATE AT ANY TIME THE POLICIES AND BENEFITS
DESCRIBED IN THIS MANUAL. The lawyer concluded by stating
that such disclaimer clauses are enforced by the courts.
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY QUESTIONS
(Excerpted)
LAW & JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE: SURVEY
Once you’ve completely read the scenario, please answer the
following questions with the scale provided. They ask about the facts
included in the version of the scenario that you read. Some of these
facts may have been present in your version, some of the facts may
not have been. Please look back at the scenario if you are uncertain
what to answer.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Not sure

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

According to the version of the scenario that you read . . .
(Law Condition Manipulation Check)
1.
2.
3.
4.

APEX’s orientation included a presentation made by the
company lawyer.
APEX’s orientation included a presentation that discussed atwill employment issues.
APEX’s orientation discussed something called a “disclaimer
clause.”
APEX’s Employee Manual includes a “disclaimer clause” on
the front cover.
(Substantive Fairness Manipulation Check)

5.
6.

The specific reason given for your firing seemed fair.
The specific reason given for your firing seemed appropriate.
(Procedural Fairness Manipulation Check)

7.
8.

APEX followed all the necessary procedures when implementing your
firing.
APEX failed to follow some of the necessary procedures when
carrying out your firing.
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The following questions ask you about your opinions of APEX, its
conduct, and the law. Please answer honestly using the scale
provided.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Not sure

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

(Global Fairness Perceptions)
9. In general, APEX seems like a fair company.
10. In general, APEX seems to do things fairly.
11. Overall, I believe APEX is a fair employer.
(Law and Fairness)
12. APEX’s conduct violated the law.
13. APEX’s conduct was legal but unfair.
14. The current state of the law strikes a fair balance between the interests
of employers and employees.
15. The law on employment discharge should be changed to be more
protective of employees.
16. Ultimately what is fair in firing employees is what the law recognizes
as legally sufficient.
17. The trend in employment discharge law is toward greater protection of
employees.
18. The law of employment discharge should change according to
society’s sense of fairness.
19. The employment-at-will rule need not be changed because employees
are free to negotiate better terms of employment.
20. Most employees do not know or understand the meaning of the
employment-at-will rule.
21. Most employees believe that they cannot be fired without a good cause
or reason.
22. Most employees believe that it should be illegal for an employer to fire
an employee without following the rules outlined in the employee
handbook.
23. The law needs limits on employment at will because employees do not
possess the required information to make an informed employment
decision.
24. Even when employees are educated as to the employment-at-will
doctrine, they fail to understand its importance.
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25. Even when employees understand the employment-at-will doctrine,
they are powerless to negotiate better terms with a new employer.
Assume that you were asked to work for two more weeks before officially
leaving APEX. You were therefore what is called a “lame duck employee”—
someone who has been fired but must still come into work for some specified
amount of time. The questions to follow ask how likely it is that you would
engage in various behaviors during those last two weeks. Please answer
honestly using the scale below.
1
Very Unlikely

2
Unlikely

3
Neither Unlikely
nor Likely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

During those last two weeks at APEX, I would:
(Task Performance)
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Adequately complete my assigned duties.
Fulfill the responsibilities specified in my job description.
Perform tasks that are expected of me.
Meet the formal requirements of my job.
Engage in those activities that directly affect my performance.
Neglect aspects of my job that I am obligated to perform.
Fail to perform essential duties.
(Citizenship Behavior)

33. Help others who have been absent.
34. Willingly give my time to help others who have work-related
problems.
35. Adjust my work schedule to accommodate other employees’
requests for time off.
36. Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in
the work group.
37. Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even
under the most trying situations.
38. Give up time to help others who have work or non-work
problems.
39. Assist others with their duties.
40. Share personal property with others to help them work.
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41. Attend functions that are not required but that help the
organizational image.
42. Keep up with the developments of the organization.
43. Defend the organization when other employees criticize it.
44. Show pride when representing the organization in public.
45. Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization.
46. Express loyalty toward the organization.
47. Take action to protect the organization from potential
problems.
48. Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization.
(Withdrawal Behavior)
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Think about being absent.
Chat with coworkers about non-work topics on work time.
Leave my workstation for unnecessary reasons.
Daydream during work.
Spend work time on personal matters.
Put less effort into the job.
Think about leaving the job.
Let others do my work.
Leave work early without permission.
Take longer lunch or rest breaks than allowed.
Fall asleep at work.
(Counterproductive Behavior)

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Damage property belonging to my employer.
Say or do something to purposely hurt someone at work.
Do work badly, incorrectly, or slowly on purpose.
Gripe with coworkers.
Deliberately bend or break a rule or rules.
Criticize people at work.
Do something that harms my employer or boss.
Start an argument with someone at work.
Say rude things about my supervisor or organization.

Once you had officially left APEX, would you be tempted to pursue legal
action against the company? The questions to follow ask how likely it is that
you would engage in various courses of legal action against APEX. Please
answer honestly using the scale below.
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Unlikely

3
Neither Unlikely
nor Likely

4
Likely

523

5
Very Likely

After being fired from APEX, I would:
(Litigation Intentions)
69.
70.
71.
72.

Pursue legal action against APEX.
Sue APEX for wrongful discharge.
Take APEX to court over my firing.
Sue APEX for unfair discharge, even though it did not do anything
technically illegal.
73. Take legal action against APEX, even though no laws were broken.
If I did bring suit against APEX, I would:
(Settlement Intentions)
74. Settle before reaching trial if an equitable agreement could be reached.
75. Settle before reaching a verdict if a fair compromise could be found.
76. Refuse to settle so APEX could experience the stress of a guilty verdict.
77. Refuse to let APEX “off the hook” by settling out of court.
After any legal action was concluded, I would:
(Retaliation Intentions)
78. Continue to say bad things about APEX to potential clients or
customers.
79. Let everyone know that APEX is not a company to be trusted.
80. Try to steer people away from doing business with APEX.
81. Discourage friends or family from applying for jobs with APEX.
I would be less likely to pursue legal action or retaliate against APEX if:
(Employability Security)
82. I received state-of-the-art training while employed at APEX.
83. APEX had an industry reputation for educating their employees with
cutting-edge employment skills.
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84. Ex-employees of APEX were considered highly marketable in the
industry because of APEX’s in-house training programs.
85. APEX was considered an industry leader in innovation and employee
development.

